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This thesis examines the concept of the national interest
from the perspective of strategic planning. The basic premise
is that an articulation of the national interest is essential
if the nation's strategic planning is to become more effective.
After outlining some methodological problems and issues
which are related to this task, the thesis begins by review-
ing the problems that have precluded such an articulation.
The two primary obstacles that are discussed are the lack of
consensus about the philosophic nature of the concept itself,
and the eternal debate between realism and idealism in
politics. The nature of the American character is examined
as the fundamental determinant of the national interest.
The concluding chapter considers the requirements of strategic
planning in terms of what functions the concept of the
national interest must fulfill. In light of these require-
ments, it is argued that only a value-centered approach to
defining the national interest, which recognizes the import-
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I. INTRODUCTION
"America is, above all, about ideas and dreams - far more
than interests" [1]
.
Strategic planning, in the context of national security
affairs, is an arcane profession, advanced slightly beyond art,
but lacking the rigorous general theory that would qualify it
for the realm of science. The planner must draw upon the
knowledge of a wide range of disciplines - history, philosophy,
psychology, sociology, and many others - to produce what, at
best, is usually a stochastic forecast. His task is to attempt
to look into the future and to devise strategies which assure
that American interests are safeguarded against any threats
which the future may hold.
Recently, Senator John Glenn offered the following crit-
icism of America's strategic planning: "The United States
has not yet developed a coherent, long-range national strategy
with clear goals and objectives acceptable to the American
people and shared by its allies" [2J. There has been little
effort to refute this charge, for it is essentially valid.
Foremost among the reasons for this failure to develop a
national strategy is the lack of a clearly articulated con-
cept of the national interest.
This deficiency is not attributable to any dearth of
attention to the problem of the national interest. Since
Charles Beard examined The Idea of the National Interest
half a century ago, there has been vigorous and continuous
debate over this concept. In the words of historian and
political scientist Fred A. Sonderman:
"... the concept of the national interest . . . has interested
and baffled students of international relations for many
years. Those of us who try to understand and teach about
the realities of foreign policy and international rela-
tions have been variously attracted to, and puzzled, or
even repelled by, the concept. But like the moth and the
flame, few of us have managed to stay entirely away from
it." [3]
Rather, the problem, as Professor Sonderman 's comment suggests,
has been a lack of consensus on the concept of the national
interest.
Two distinct areas of disagreement among both scholars
and policy-makers have posed obstacles to consensus. The
first has concerned the nature of the concept itself; should
the national interest be conceptualized in normative terms,
as an aggregation of particular interests, or merely as the
observance of accepted procedural norms? In this largely
philosophic debate, some theorists have even taken the posi-
tion that this issue is beyond resolution, concluding that the
concept cannot be defined with sufficient precision to be of
any value to policy-makers.
The second matter of dispute has engaged practical
decision-makers as well as scholars and philosophers. This
is the long-standing argument of realism versus idealism as
the proper basis of national policy. The problem of reconcil-
ing pragmatic national self-interests with abstract moral
principles which Americans have generally held to transcend
the interests of particular nations is one of the central
themes of American foreign policy; it is also a substantial
barrier to achieving consensus on the concept of the national
interest.
In the absence of this consensus, it has proven impossible
to formulate the clear goals and objectives which must provide
the foundation for any national strategy. The result, far too
often, has been that strategic planning has degenerated into
mere reaction to urgent problems, producing policies that
respond to the demand of the moment, but reflect little
thought of future ramifications.
Although some would argue that U.S. foreign policy has
exhibited a high degree of consistency, it has become apparent
during the past two turbulent decades that this ad hoc approach
to policy-making is inadequate to ensure that the nation's
vital interests are protected. This point was well made by
retired U.S. Army General A. C. Wedemeyer shortly before his
death. In reflecting upon his more than forty years as an
observer and participant in the national policy-making
machinery, he urged the implementation of measures to improve
the country's strategic planning. He stated,
"My present concern arises not only from the conviction
that our governmental machinery and methods are little
improved over those of the past, but also from the
knowledge that today's world is a far more dangerous
one than that of yesteryear. We could get by in World
War II with what we had and what we did. Our security
and prosperity in the future, I am sure, will require
more." [4]
In an increasingly crowded world, much of which may fairly be
characterized as hostile to democratic values and the American
way of life, more effective strategic planning has become a
critical requirement.
The first task necessary to make this improved planning
a reality is assuredly the most difficult; that is the articu-
lation of a concept of the national interest from which long-
range goals may be derived in an environment of uncertainty.
This thesis undertakes the formidable task of proposing such
a concept, one that will meet the needs of the strategic
planner. The fundamental assumption which supports the belief
that this endeavor has potential value for the nation's
strategic planners is the conviction that the national interest
is a social reality. A clear statement of that reality is a
necessary prerequisite for developing a national strategy,
or even defining the goals which the nation seeks to attain.
One additional rationale led to the selection of the
concept of the national interest as a topic for thesis level
research. No major treatment of this issue has been under-
taken with a view toward the requirements of strategic
planning. While many excellent analyses of the national
interest are available, the majority are either issue-oriented
(and therefore too specific) or are abstract philosophic
treatises (and are therefore too general). A mid-range theory
of the national interest which can provide planners with a
basis for developing both national goals, and the strategies
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to achieve those goals, has been lacking. Therefore, the
emphasis throughout this thesis will be upon the utility of
various alternate conceptualizations of the national interest
to the strategic planner.
The nature of this topic dictates that subjective norma-
tive values as well as objective realities must be examined
in connection with the national interest. This concept, as it
has evolved in the United States, cannot be understood out-
side the context of the American Dream. Any attempt to assess
the national interest must, in large part, address the ques-
tion posed over 200 years ago by Hector St. John Crevecoeur:
"What, then, is the American, this new man?" [5]. The plural-
ity and the paradoxes of the answers to Crevecoeur ' s famous
question have intrigued and puzzled observers of American
national behavior throughout the nation's history. This
effort to articulate a concept of the national interest that
will be useful to strategic planners will, by necessity, focus
on the requirement that any concept of the national interest
be compatible with the American Dream.
Methodological issues and problems relevant to the study
of the national interest are briefly addressed in Chapter II.
Chapters III and IV review the two major areas of disagreement
that have precluded consensus on the concept of the national
interest, the nature of the concept in Chapter III, and the
issue of idealism versus realism in Chapter IV. In Chapter V,
the development and nature of the American national character
11
are examined, as a necessary prelude to any attempt to resolve
the questions raised in the two preceding chapters. Finally,
Chapter VI outlines the requirements for strategic planning
which the concpet of the national interest must meet, and




II. A QUEST FOR A METHODOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS
George Santayana, who devoted a lifetime to probing into
the metaphysics of spirit that make America a unique nation,
wrote, "To be an American is of itself almost a moral condi-
tion, an education, and a career" [6] . At least the last
two elements of Santayana ' s observation could be applied
equally well to the study of the national interest, as that
concept has developed over the two centuries of American
historical experience as an independent nation. The selection
of a research method suitable for the exploration of this
vast subject proved to be as much of a challenge as did the
subsequent analysis.
The author's initial approach attempted to utilize the
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methodology of substantive content analysis, using key foreign
policy statements of government leaders as the sample for
analysis. Such statements which reveal some conception of
national purpose are plentiful; consider, for example, the
following illustrations:
"In short, the flames kindled on the 4th of July 1776,
have spread over too much of the globe to be extinguished
by the feeble engines of despotism; on the contrary, they
will consume these engines and all who work them." [7]
(Thomas Jefferson, 1821)
"The United States goes not abroad in search of monsters
to destroy. She is the well-wisher in the freedom and
independence of all. She is the champion only of her
own." [8] (John Quincey Adams, 1821)
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"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill,
that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure
the survival and success of liberty." [9] (John F. Kennedy,
1961)
"The United States is not looking for opportunities to
demonstrate its manhood." [10] (Henry Kissinger, 1975)
Clearly, each of these statements reflects some conception
of the national interest held by the speaker; it is equally
clear that there is a substantial difference of opinion
represented in this small sub-sample. Content analysis failed
to provide any basis to go beyond the obvious generalization
that such differences of opinion have existed. One could, if
so desired, arrange American history into a series of chrono-
logical periods in which one or another concept of the national
interest seemed to dominate foreign policy pronouncements.
Even this relatively simple task encounters obstacles during
certain periods (including the present one) when no clear con-
sensus on the national purpose is apparent. Moreover, this
research method does not move the researcher any closer to a
theory of the national interest which can facilitate contem-
porary strategic planning. In short, content analysis was
an adequate first stage in the research design, but was
insufficient to support any conclusions beyond descriptive
historical analysis.
The second phase of research consisted of a systematic
and comprehensive survey of works that can be generally
categorized under the classification of contemporary social
14
and political history. The literature of American studies
provides a rich variety of speculative studies by men who
were astute observers of their contemporary millieu. From
Alexis de Toqueville to T. H. White, the substance of the
American character and the motivations for the nation's
foreign policy have provoked some of the brightest minds of
each generation to attempt to explain America to itself and
to the world. Following de Toqueville, analyses by William
James, John Dewey, Herbert Croley, Walter Lippman , Charles
Beard, Henry Steele Commager, Hans Morganthau, and Robert
Osgood have explored the concept of the national (or public)
interest.
In the current generation of writers on this subject,
philosophers and historians have been largely superceded by
journalists as the most prolific observers of the American
experiment. Contemporaries who have attempted to identify
the beliefs and interests of the American people include,
along with T. H. White, such respected reporters as David
Broder, Godfrey Hodgson, David Halberstam, and Theodore
Draper. From these individuals whose insights derive from
the reporting and analysis of current news, one can discern
how the national interest has been conceptualized by both
political elites and the public at large.
Analysis of these works appeared to lend itself to a
modified version of the focused comparison case study method-
3
ology pioneered by historian Alexander George. As a
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preliminary step undertaken to assess the viability of this
research strategy, four major theorists (Beard, Osgood,'
Lippman, and White) were considered as unique cases for
structured comparison. In order to utilize these cases as
building blocks toward a general theory of the national
interest, three general questions were posed for each case.
These were:
- did the writer consider the concept of the national
interest to be a substantive entity which contributed
(or should contribute) to the formulation of American
foreign policy?
- what were the component parts of the national interest,
and how were they identified?
- what was the postulated relationship between the national
interest and the national character?
While this case study approach provided a useful organiz-
ing scheme for research, it did not, in and of itself, yield
any basis for a general concept of the national interest which
was compatible with all of the cases examined. Each writer
developed his own theoretical framework of analysis, and
although there was some overlap, each case presented signif-
icant unique features. These unique perceptions of individual
theorists provided far greater insight into the concept of
the national interest than did any amalgamation of common
factors. Attempting to simplify each of the theories presented
to make them fit into a single conceptual framework would
deprive them of the very richness which makes them worthy of
study.
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The difficulties encountered in applying these accepted
research methods to the concept of the national interest
led to reflection upon why this topic should be such a
difficult one to explore with a simple research strategy.
What emerged from this consideration was the realization that
every major treatment of the national interest has been
inferential, subjective, and impressionistic, all qualities
which are not easily adapted to methods designed to organize
quantifiable data. Moreover, the absence of a general theory
which satisfactorily explains the nature and the role of the
national interest in the context of strategic planning poses
several methodological problems beyond this inability to
subject data to rigorous measurement.
A. THE SCARCITY OF POSITIVE THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
Economist Milton Friedman has outlined some of the
methodological problems which result from the lack of posi-
tive theoretical knowledge. First, it means that we lack
what Friedman calls "a filing system for organizing empirical
material and facilitating our understanding of it" [11] . In
the context of the national interest, this problem is mani-
fested in a high degree of uncertainty regarding causes and
effects - is a particular foreign policy inspired by a given
conception of the national interest, or is that interest only
defined after the fact to give the policy greater legitimacy?
This one example reflects the more general problem that
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plagues all research in the social sciences (i.e., any field
which is dominated by human behavior) which might be termed
the indeterminacy of causation.
Friedman was among the first to explore the implications
of the now commonly accepted precept that hypotheses can never
be definitely proven, that the researcher can only look for
hypotheses which cannot be disproven. He noted that a per-
fectly realistic theory must encompass all the details rele-
vant to the phenomenon under investigation. In the case of
the national interest, even the clearly relevant data exceeds
the practical grasp of any researcher. Merely assembling
the data for investigation clearly fits Santayana's defini-
tional elements of an education and a career.
Accordingly, simplifying assumptions must be made at the
outset. The basis of scholarly analysis is the identifica-
tion of the most useful and illuminating assumptions, those
which can provide the most accurate guides to an otherwise
incomprehensibly complex reality. As Friedman points out,
"A fundamental hypothesis of science is that appearances
are deceptive and that there is a way of looking at or
interpreting or organizing the evidence that will reveal
superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be
manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively
simple structure ... A theory is the way we perceive
'facts' and we cannot perceive 'facts' without a
theory." [12]
The lack of an adequate theory which explains the concept of
the national interest implies that the researcher's first




Friedman's analysis of the indispensable requirement for
theory includes the following warning:
"If there is one hypothesis that is consistent with the
available evidence, there are always an infinite number
that are . .
.
The choice among the alternative hypotheses
equally consistent with the available evidence must be
to some extent arbitrary ..." [13]
The literature which examines the concept of the national
interest supports Friedman's observation that more than one
hypothesis may be consistent with the evidence. The fact
that a wide range of concepts can be shown to have motivated
individual policy-makers and foreign policy decisions demon-
strates the validity of this assumption.
Additionally, the incorporation of statistical techniques
into the research methods of social science has popularized
the notion that no hypothesis is ever accepted or rejected
without reservation; rather its validity is associated with
some degree of confidence or some confidence interval. This
attached qualifier on every hypothesis remains forever tenta-
tive and flexible, pending the accumulation of additional
data. The recognition that all explanations are probabilities,
not certainties, magnifies the importance of the conclusions
reached by Friedman regarding the implications of the scarcity
of positive theoretical knowledge.
B. METAHISTORY AS METHODOLOGY
Consideration of these methodological problems yielded
the inescapable conclusion that this thesis was going to be
frankly exploratory, and based largely upon traditional
19
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methods of logical analysis. What this study attempts to
do is best described by the term 'metahistory ' coined by Sir
Isiah Berlin. Metahistory is the attempt to discover in
history "patterns, regularities, and similarities on whose
recurrence is built a philosophical explanation of human
existence" [14] . In this case, the goal is an explanation,
not of all human existence, but just the concept of the
national interest, and its role and utility for strategic
planning.
Alan Bullock points out that many professional historians
eye this speculative craft with distrust and dislike [15]
.
Although its practitioners have included such intellectual
giants as Hegel, Marx, 'Spengler, and Toynbee (and in our own
age, Henry Kissinger) critics of metahistory have objected
that those who seek from the study of history a substitute
for philosophy or religion are asking more from an academic
discipline than it can give. While this criticism has some
validity, in that metahistorians have produced various and
contradictory interpretations, the essence of the appeal of
this speculative activity was succinctly stated by the Belgian
mediavalist Pirenne: "Without hypothesis or synthesis,
history remains a pastime for antiquarians" [16]
.
The objective of this research, the discovery of a usable
synthesis of conflicting interpretations of the concept of
the national interest, requires both intellectual audacity
(if not conceit) and a leap of faith that such a synthesis
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is posssible. These are the pre-conditions for attempting to
elicit from history a system of metaphysical precepts concern-
ing the national interest in the face of skepticism from those
wiser and more experienced than this author. Additionally,
no other methodology seems capable of providing even tentative
conclusions regarding a concept as large and complex as the
national interest.
Finally, it should be clear that the usual caveats of
social science research apply, those which qualify conclusions
even in the areas where a large body of theoretical knowledge
is generally accepted. First, to quote Friedman again, "the
investigator is himself part of the subject matter being
investigated, and personal biases may distort the findings,
however, much one strives for objectivity" [17]. Second,
history does not provide the opportunity for controlled or
replicable experiments; each event is played only once. As
a result,
"evidence is far more difficult to interpret (than in the
physical sciences) . It is frequently complex and always
indirect and incomplete. Its collection is often arduous,
and its interpretation generally requires subtle analysis
and involved chains of reasoning, which seldom carry real
conviction ... It renders the weeding-out of unsuccessful
hypotheses slow and difficult." [18]
The net result of the methodological difficulties des-
cribed in this chapter is that this study is far from a
scientific endeavor. It is highly unlikely that another
researcher could exactly duplicate the path followed by the
author and arrive at the same conclusions. To a large degree,
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those conclusions are speculative and tentative. The decision
to adopt the methods of metahistory dictate that the author's
own political and cultural socialization will heavily influence
the interpretation of the evidence. In view of the fact that
the subject of this thesis is primarily a question of phil-
osophic reasoning rather than verifiable data, this is probably
an unavoidable weakness of the analysis which follows.
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III. COMPETING CONCEPTS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
As the politics among nations have changed over time, so
too has the concept of the national interest. In the nine-
teenth century, when both the external threat to the United
States and American involvement in world affairs were limited,
the concept was most commonly expressed in the phrase 'national
honor 1 [19]. During the twentieth century, as America's
participation in international politics expanded, the term
national interests more accurately reflected the broad scope
of the nation's concerns. Since the 1950 's and the advent of
the nuclear bipolar world, this concept has increasingly been
defined in terms of national security or defense. Certainly
in the 1980 's, many policies that have little connection with
the survival of the population or the territory of the United
States are justified on the basis of national defense.
In theory, the definition of the national interest, in
whatever form it may take for a given political era, is what
determines the direction of national policy and, indeed, the
very future of the nation. This concept establishes the
criteria by which policy selections are made and
evaluated [20] . The national interest is the expression of
the broad goals and the essential identity of the country;
as such, it serves as the mechanism by which the nation's
pluralistic desires and concerns are integrated into cohesive
national policy.
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In reality, however, the concept of the national interest
is surrounded by confusion and disagreement. William Meyer
noted with dismay that the "real meaning of the public
interest - involving common purposes, shared goals, etc. -
has little credibility today" [21] . He proceeded to describe,
however, how the term has been kept in use to serve a number
of purposes. Political leaders justify policies in terms of
the public interest, citing this concept as the basis for
public support. David Truman, despite the disclaimer that
"we do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest,
because one does not exist," 1 2 2 J discussed the manner in
which appeals to such an inclusive interest are used for
propaganda purposes. He commented that such appeals,
especially when framed in terms of national security, are
emotionally and symbolically useful in mustering support and
solidarity. Harold Lasswell's treatment of the public
interest viewed it as a way of rationalizing the displacement
of private motives onto public objects 123].
All of these views of the national interest focus, not
upon any substantive content, but simply upon the assertion
that such an interest is the motivation for a particular
policy. Not the interest itself, but the making of a claim
to the interest, is what has interested modern political
scientists such as Truman, Lasswell, and David Easton. The
most common explanation of the concept is a functional or
instrumental interpretation; that is reflected in the
24
conventional wisdom of political science that holds that,
although there is no existential public interest with a
specified content, there is a political function served by
reference to such an interest, presumably a symbolic or
exhortative function.
Another common adaptation of the term discussed by Meyer
is the pluralist view that the public interest stands for
either the political process itself, or the outcome of the
process, with no regard for what that outcome might be.
Glendon Schubert, who has compiled the most thorough and
detailed inventory of the literature concerned with the
public interest, designated this view as "realist theory" [24]
He concluded that, in the final analysis, the concept of
the public interest makes no operational sense, and might as
well be abandoned by political scientists. Frank Sorauf
concurred with this view, stating that "the term is too
burdened with multiple meanings for valuable use as a tool
of political analysis" [25],
At the heart of this criticism of the concept of the
national (or public) interest is the disparity among compet-
ing conceptualizations that have been advanced by scholars,
statesmen, and philosophers, and the fact that no one has
succeeded in either disproving any of the contradictory
hypotheses, or. in reconciling them under one general theory.
This debate has concerned, not the substance of the national
interest, but how the question of defining it should be
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framed. To a large extent, the framing of the question pre-
determines the content of the answer. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide a review of how major contemporary
theories of the national interest frame the question.
Before turning to particular conceptions of the national
interest, however, the first task of this chapter is to clear
away a problem of semantics which plagues many treatments of
this subject. This problem concerns the usage of the terms
"public interest" and "national interest," which are some-
times used interchangably and sometimes are not. There does
not appear to be any general agreement among political
scientists as to whether these two terms are synonomous, or
whether each has a specific application. In order to avoid
confusion in the discussion which follows, this issue requires
resolution at the outset.
In the broadest sense, the two terms convey the same idea.
What is in the interest of the nation must, perforce, be in
the interest of the public which constitutes the nation's
population. Writers who employ the terms synonomously seldom
bother to explain this obvious tautology. Either term, or
both, may be used to connote the concept of the national
identity and ultimate aims which motivate public policy. The
nature of the issue toward which the policy is directed is
not relevant to the choice of phrases.
However, many political scientists, especially during
the last quarter-century, have adopted a convention of usage
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which separates the two terms on the basis of issues. By
this convention, the public interest is related only to issues
of domestic policy, while the national interest is used only
in the context of international relations and foreign
policy.
As long as all parties to the dialogue are aware of the
distinction made by this semantic convention, it can add
clarity to the discussion. However, because the convention
is not universally accepted, particularly when the writings
of political theorists of past centuries are brought into
the debate, it can introduce confusion. Confusion results in
either one of two possible situations. The first is when
the writer does not distinguish between the terms, but the
reader is accustomed to thinking in terms of the modern
convention. The second arises when the writer does use
each phrase in its specialized context, but the reader is
unaware of the distinction.
At the level of metaphysics, which is the concern of this
chapter concerning philosophic conceptualizations of the
national interest, there is nothing to be gained by making a
distinction between the public and the national interest.
Either term adequately conveys the broad concept which
provides the foundation of legitimacy for public policy in
a democracy.
However, in order to be as explicit as possible in the
absence of generally accepted defintiions for either of these
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terms, the following rules of usage will be observed through-
out this thesis: the public interest will be used in the
largest sense, whether the orientation is foreign policy or
domestic issues. The phrase 'national interest' will be
employed in the restricted context of international politics
and foreign policy. The public interest as it relates to
matters of purely domestic concern will be termed the domestic
interest. Thus, the national interest, which is the primary
focus of this thesis as it is the primary concern of strategic
planners, represents one element, or a sub-set, of the public
interest. In this chapter which examines the conceptual
problem of the national interest, it is actually the larger
public interest concept which is at the center of the debate.
With these semantic groundrules established, the discus-
sion can now proceed to an examination of competing concepts
of the public interest. Four major philosophic approaches
to framing the question of how the national interest should
be defined will be reviewed; these are the normative, aggrega-
tionist, procedural, and rejectionist schools of thought.
A. THE NORMATIVE CONCEPT
This conceptualization of the public interest is the
first of two substantive philosophic approaches that will be
examined. Prior to reviewing normative theory, a brief
introduction of the substantive approach is necessary.
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This approach postulates that the public interest exists
as a substantive entity which can be known, and once known,
can serve as the guide for public policy. Throughout history,
from Plato's philosopher king to Karl Marx's class struggle,
many political theorists have attempted to discover, or to
persuade their fellow men that they have discovered, the
principle which reveals the substantive essence of the public
interest. This approach led to a search for the "natural
laws" which govern the relations of men and society. This
philosophic conception dominated the dialogue on the public
interest until near the end of the last century.
Two contemporary theories of the public interest subscribe
to this substantive approach. Although they share the common
premise that the public interest is a discernable quantity,
they disagree on the method of determining that quantity.
Within each of these two broad schools of thought, there is a
wide variety of specific theories which attempt to define, or
to provide a mechanism for defining, the public interest.
These two fundamental conceptions of the public interest are
the normative approach, which is described below, and the
aggregationist concept, which is taken up in the following
section.
In its basic configuration, a normative conception of
the public interest is founded upon some unitary value or
internally consistent scheme of values. Only those interests
which are justified in accordance with the idealized value
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system constitute legitimate public or national interests.
This philosophic approach defines the public interest as a
moral precept, something which, for its own sake, ought to be
the object of all public policy. The public philosophy of
the Soviet Union, which defines all public interactions in
terms of class struggle, is an excellent contemporary example
of a normative concept of the public interest.
The appeal of the normative approach lies in its certainty
and its simplicity. Guided by fundamental and inherently
valid moral principles or natural laws, those responsible for
the formulation of public policy are provided an infallible
reference. The corresponding danger of this conception is
that down this path lie dictatorship and totalitarianism.
As exemplified by the six decades of communist rule in the
Soviet Union, those in power who are the guardians of the
public interest are, in their own view, justified in ruth-
lessly suppressing any number of people who disagree with
the accepted normative definition of that interest.
The danger of normative theory serving as the basis for
dictatorial abuse of power is actually the less important of
two reasons that normative conceptions of the public interest
have largely been dismissed by Western political thinkers.
The second and more important reason derives from the epistomo-
logical revolution that began with the Enlightenment; this
intellectual renaissance swept away absolutes in favor of
philosophic and cultural relativism. Progress in the physical
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sciences, reflected in the discoveries and theories of Plank,
Heisenberg, and Einstein, completed the transcendance of
relativism as the dominant mode of thought in the modern
climate of opinion. In this climate, any absolute frame of
reference is viewed with skepticism; the criteria for norma-
tive evaluation have been discredited.
A more complex normative conception of the public interest
which attempts to avoid the perils of absolutism is expressed
by such terms as the "common good" or the "general welfare."
This conceptualization identifies the public interest with some
existential harmony of interests within the community which
possesses sufficient objectivity to yield concrete public
policies which ought to be pursued. Rousseau's postulation of
a general will that comes into existence when men join together
to form a body politic which "refers to their common conserva-
tion and general welfare" [26] expresses the fundamental tenet
of this conception of the public interest. The key assumption
to this approach is that the general will is both greater and
wiser than the sum of the individual wills of all the members
of the community. The interpretation of the general will
represents the public interest, conceived and expressed in
normative terms.
Many political theorists have attempted to clarify the
concept of the common good in order that it may become a
usable guide in the formulation of public policy. Walter
Lippman wrote, "the public interest may be presumed to be
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what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally,
acted disinterestedly and benevolently" [27]. Bertrand de
Jouvevel, in his assessment of the common good, could only
conclude that it was neither self-evident nor entirely
subjective. In his analysis, the common good was finally
perceived as somehow "residing in the strength of the social
tie" 128].
The difficulty of utilizing the concept of the common
good as the operational definition of the public interest is
readily apparent when it is confronted by a reality in which
conflict among individual interests abounds. Experience has
amply demonstrated that men neither see clearly, think
rationally, nor act with disinterest and benevolence with
any degree of consistence. This approach leads to the same
unacceptable consequence as does upholding some unitary ideal-
ized value system - a dictatorship, in which some ultimate
authority, such as Rousseau's "Legislator," discerns the true
common good and hands down laws which the citizenry is forced
to obey. This philosophic approach is compatible with govern-
ment for the people (provided that the despot is a benevolent
one) but not government by the people.
An additional problem with the concept of the common
good, or natural harmony of interests, concept is the
regularity with which it has been abused, both in domestic
and international political contexts. Proponents of the
natural harmony of interests have been guilty, in Edward H.
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Carr's words, of "clothing (their) own interests in the guise
of a universal interest for the purpose of imposing it on the
rest of the world" 129] . Whenever the common good is cited
as the justification for a political action, thoughtful
skeptics quickly look to see what special interest is being
advanced or whose ox is being gored.
Before leaving the normative concept of the public
interest, an evaluation of the utility of this approach is
merited. Only to the degree to which a philosophic concept
can be externalized and applied by policy-makers and planners
does it have value to those responsible for safe-guarding the
interests of the nation.
Certainly in abstract terms, the public interest can be
expressed as a normative concept; every citizen will agree
that national self-preservation is in the public interest.
However, as soon as one attempts to delineate the character-
istics of the national "self" which we wish to preserve,
general agreement becomes unattainable. National self-
preservation can include a wide range of goals, from preserv-
ing the lives of the population to maintaining the ability
to influence world events.
Unfortunately, decisions affecting public policy, either
foreign or domestic, require a pragmatic "nuts and bolts"
approach far more frequently than they do a simple normative
statement about self-preservation. The public interest is
expressed through policies which are formulated by choosing
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from among a variety of specific details. At this level,
even when general agreement exists at the abstract level,
consensus on means to reach broadly defined goals cannot be
attained. We are apparently left with two choices - either
abandoning the normative concept entirely, or accepting the
necessity for an authoritative governing body which will
define the public interest by virtue of superior wisdom.
Since the second choice is clearly unacceptable in a
democracy, should we then dispense with all normative theories
of the public interest? Such a decision would negate the
possibility of basing any public policy upon the idealistic
values which most Americans believe give this nation its
quality of "exceptionalism. " Some of these values, such as
the dignity of the individual, are essential to the belief
in democracy as a viable form of government. Complete rejec-
tion of the normative concept would result in an ad hoc
approach to making public policy which looks only to the
present moment for justification, and pretends that the future
will not judge our actions by normative standards. To a large
degree, this is an accurate description of the manner in which
the United States has fashioned its foreign policy during the
past two decades, with unfortunate, and sometimes tragic,
results
.
Here it is appropriate to interject an idea that will be
developed more fully in the concluding chapter of the thesis.
That is that the task of strategic planners is significantly
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different from that of officials in a policy-making role,
who must respond to current daily problems. The planner
must consider the national interest in a much more abstract
context than those who deal in specific problematic situations
Thus, the abstract normative concept of the public interest
may have greater utility for the planner than it does for
the policy-maker.
Perhaps the normative concept is applicable only to issues
that are too vague and too broad to be of use to the policy-
maker who is responsible for some specific issue of public
policy. On the other hand, this conception of the public
interest, if it can win a consensus, is capable of inspiring
the highest degree of democratic compliance. The difficulties
inherent in attaining agreement upon a normative concept
should not cause us to discard this approach entirely.
Clearly, any "all purpose" normative conception which can
guide policy under all circumstances is not viable. For the
policy-maker, the problem is to determine under what condi-
tions such a concept is appropriate; then when these condi-
tions are met, public policy can be formulated and explained
to the public on the basis of accepted normative values.
For the strategic planner, the normative conception of
the public interest must be understood in a larger context.
At the minimum, it serves as an ever-present boundary which
defines what strategic options will be acceptable to the
American people and which will not. Certain democratic
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values may not be ignored by planners, regardless of what
pragmatic interests may be gained by doing so. For long-
range planning, a normative concept of the national interest
is also a necessary ingredient in the formulation of goals;
this function of normative theory will also be discussed in
greater detail in the concluding chapter.
B. THE AGGREGATIONIST CONCEPT
As a result of the problems encountered in attempting to
define the public interest in normative terms, some theorists
have rejected this concept, yet still adhere to a substantive
approach. They agree with the premise that the public interest
is a substantive entity which ought to guide public policy;
where they depart from normative thinkers is in the method
for determining the content of the public interest. In this
second substantive approach, the key to defining the public
interest is in the aggregation of individual interests.
The aggregationist concept of the public interest developed
out of the attempt by several important political philosophers
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
particularly in England, to identify a substitute for the
superhuman or Divine order which had provided the foundation
for earlier normative conceptions. The departure from the
search for Divine-willed natural lwas, and the turn toward
purely human explanations of governmental authority, was
the essence of English philosophic development during the Age
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of Enlightenment, which would subsequently exert great
influence upon the genesis of American political theory.
Political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Joseph Priestly,
and John Locke established the foundation upon which Jeremy
Bentham would later build in developing an entirely new con-
cept of the public interest - Utilitarianism.
Benthamism, or Utilitarianism, offers a simple rule for
defining the public interest of a society filled with individ-
ual conflicts of interest. The primary principle is the
"greatest happiness of the greatest number" [30], In a
statement which would greatly influence the thinking of Bentham,
Joseph Priestly noted in his Essay on the First Principle of
Government , "The good and happiness of the members, that is
the majority of the members, of any State, is the great
standard by which everything relating to that State must
finally be determined" [31] .
Bentham' s idea of aggregating individual interests on
the basis of a simple pain-pleasure calculus to define the
public interest became doctrine for all subsequent aggrega-
tionist concepts of the public interest. John Stuart Mill
called Bentham one of the "two great seminal minds of England
in (their) age" 132] . In the same essay, he referred to
Bentham as "the greatest critical thinker of his age and
country" [33]. Thomas Jefferson's assumption of happiness
as the object of political organization was almost certainly
derived from his familiarity with Bentham 's principle of
the greatest happiness for the greatest number [34]
.
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Contemporary theories which approach the public interest
from the aggregationist concept define it as the maximiza-
tion of particular interests. Determining the public interest
is essentially a problem of measurement; once particular
interests are measured, the public interest is that which
will satisfy the greatest number. Public policy, according
to this conception, should be shaped to this end.
Some aggregationist concepts, reflecting greater sophis-
tication, go beyond the idea of measuring a simple numerical
majority of individuals. Recognizing that all individuals
do not always exert an equal influence upon public policy,
these theories assess the public interest in terms of a pre-
ponderance of particular interests. Preponderance can refer
to a simple numerical majority, but it can also derive from
political opinion, power, or influence. The public interest
is that which satisfies the preponderant majority of
individuals. This theory of the public interest seems partic-
ularly well suited to the Madisonian model of democratic con-
sensus, which is one of the important models of American
political theory.
Either the simple aggregationist concept or the more
sophisticated preponderance variant yields a substantive
public interest which, according to the proponents of this
approach, ought to guide public policy. Like the normative
approach, this concept establishes a public interest which
precedes policy. However, also like the normative concept,
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this philosophic approach suffers from serious deficiencies
when policy-makers attempt to apply it to policy formulation.
The most evident flaw in the aggregationist concept is the
problem of measurement. From a population of 240 million
people, with thousands of competing particular interests,
simple aggregation becomes infeasible. Perhaps at the level
of the New England town meeting, this approach offers a viable
method for determining the public interest; when that interest
must represent the entire nation, as is the case with foreign
policy, this concept lacks practical utility.
Another difficulty arises in accepting the preponderance
concept of the public interest. If those particular interests
which have achieved a preponderance of political power solely
define the public interest, then the ability to distinguish
between the genuine public interest and those particular
interests is lost. This results in the problem of a tyranny
of the majority which de Toqueville described in Democracy in
America a century and a half ago. In his analysis of this
problem, he argued effectively that a minority coerced remains
a minority coerced despite high-sounding statements about
men being compelled to be free [35] . Preponderance theory
ignores the tenet of American democratic theory that certain
basic rights of minorities must be included in the public
interest. John C. Calhoun, as the principal spokesman for
the minority attempting to preserve the socio-economic system
of the ante-bellum South, also condemned the power of a
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preponderant majority to trample the rights of a minority.
His concept of concurrent majorities was an attempt to escape
from this dilemma of the aggregationist concept of the public
interest [36]
.
While the aggregationist approach to the problem of the
public interest is appealing as a theoretical concept, and
is compatible with American principles of consensus among
competing factions, its utility for the practical business
of government is limited. Particularly, in the context of
strategic planning, this concept is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to apply. The planner is concerned with future con-
tingencies in which particular interests may not presently
exist, or if they exist, have not been articulated; for long-
range planning, there is nothing to measure and aggregate.
Of the two substantive concepts of the public interest, nor-
mative theories, in spite of their difficulties, are more
likely to prove useful. The next philosophic approach des-
cribed is fundamentally different; it avoids the deficiencies
of both the normative and the aggregationist concepts by
rejecting the possibility of any substantive public interest.
C. THE PROCEDURAL CONCEPT
Seeking to define the public interest in such a way as to
avoid the problems which confront either of the substantive
approaches, many contemporary theories focus on process and
procedures as the only realistic and attainable meaning of
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the public interest. (Recall Schubert's designation of this
approach as "realist theory.") The emphasis upon procedure
rather than substance denies the premise of an existential
public interest which can serve as a guide to policy; however,
this approach retains the belief in the importance of the
concept as the source of legitimacy for policy.
Rather than preceding policy, as it does in substantive
concepts, the procedural approach places the public interest
after policy [37] . The test of policy legitimacy is not some
measure of a normative "right" or "wrong," nor is it the
satisfaction of the majority of particular interests; the
criterion is whether the policy is derived from proper and
accepted democratic procedures. If these procedures are
observed, then the policy is, ipso facto
,
in the public
interest, and will be perceived as legitimate.
A comprehensive exposition of the procedural concept of
the public interest is provided by Howard R. Smith in
Democracy and the Public Interest . He concluded in this
analysis, "the public interest is most properly identified
with, not concrete policies as such, but rather a particular
kind of process by means of which it is decided what should
be done" [38] . Policy that is genuinely in the public
interest is derived, according to Smith, through the opera-
tion of democratic consensus and majority rule within the
framework of the due process of law.
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Although the procedural concept of the public interest
successfully avoids the pitfalls of substantive concepts, it
provides little practical help to the policy-maker, and even
less to the strategic planner. Proponents of this approach
can assert for the purpose of academic discussion that the
public interest is not related to concrete policies, but
finding that relationship is the very essence of the policy-
maker's job. A public interest that can only be determined
after policy is formulated cannot contribute to solving the
problem of making policy reflect the public interest. Even
less can it serve as the basis for the formulation of the
long-range national goals required by the strategic planner.
Again recognizing that actual public policy decisions
require a large number of choices among details, it is
impractical to refer each one of these choices to some kind
of democratic referendum. Among the range of choices to be
made, there are many different decisions which can be taken,
all in accordance with proper procedures. Clearly, some
decisions will be in the best interests of the nation, while
others will not. The procedural approach does not solve the
problem of articulating the public interest; it avoids it.
This criticism of the procedural concept is not intended
to imply that there is no merit whatsoever in this approach
to defining the public interest. The value of this philosophic
approach lies in its function as the court of last appeal.
When no substantive basis for the public interest can be
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identified, or can inspire a workable consensus, then the
policy-maker may fall back upon the second-best conception
of the public interest. In a democratic society, that second-
best concept is the reliance upon accepted procedures -
democratic consensus expressed through majority rule.
However, the focus of this thesis is upon the concept of
the public interest in the context of strategic planning.
The function of the public interest in this context is to
provide a basis for defining the goals upon which strategies
for the future must be founded. The procedural concept,
while it may be of some value to the policy-maker, has no
utility for the strategic planner, because it does not con-
sider or address this function of the public interest.
D. REJECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS A MEANINGFUL CONCEPT
The final contemporary approach to the problem of defining
the public interest is a relatively recent development. This
approach argues that the traditional concept of the public
interest is a myth, and further, a myth that no longer has
utility. Confronted with the complexity of making national
policy for the modern age, theorists who reject the public
interest as a useful concept postulate that the term is so
vague as to be undefinable. Since it cannot be defined with
any degree of precision Ci.e., operationalized) it is of no
use in either the actual realm of policy-making, or in the
world of scholarly analysis of governmental processes.
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Two related but distinct arguments are advanced by those
who reject the concept of the public interest. The first is
the dogmatic assertion that because the concept cannot be
operationalized, it has no utility. The second argument is
less dogmatic, but it reaches the same conclsuion as the first
This approach focuses upon the pluralistic character of
American society; the public interest may be a meaningful
concept to any specific individual or group, but no basis
can be established for consensus among competing individuals
or groups. As a result, no accommodation of the diverse
meanings of the public interest within one single concept is
possible. Since no single concept that can be applied to
policy formulation is available, the basic concept itself is
therefore without utility.
The belief that the concept of the public interest has
no real meaning for the modern world has dominated much of the
recent literature of theoretical political science. Joseph
Schumpeter argues unequivocally that "there is no such thing
as a uniquely determined common good that all people could
agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational
argument" { 39 J . He dissents from the proceduralists who
impute a "common good" label to the democratic process or the
results of that process, seeing in this concept nothing more
than a carry-over of classical democratic theory. He states,
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"But though a common will or public opinion of some sort
may still be said to emerge from the infinitely complex
jumble of individual and group^wise situations, volitions,
influences, actions and reactions of the 'democratic
process,
' the result lacks not only rational unity but
also rational sanction." [40]
A similar conclusion is reached by Schubert; because he
has examined the literature of the public interest in such
exhaustive detail, his conclusions are worth quoting at length
as the best representative of the modern school of thought
which rejects the public interest:
"American writers in the field of political science have
evolved neither a unified nor a consistent theory to
describe how the public interest is defined in governmental
decision-making; they have not constructed theoretical
models with the degree of precision and specificity neces-
sary if such models are to be used as descriptions of, or
as a guide to, the actual behavior of real people. A
theory of the public interest in governmental decision-
making ought to describe a relationship between concepts
of the public interest and official behavior in such
terms that it might be possible to attempt to validate
empirically hypotheses concerning the relationship. If
extant theory does not lend itself to such uses, it is
difficult to comprehend the justification for teaching
students of political science that subservience to the
public interest is a relevant norm of official
responsibility.
Moreover, our investigation has failed to reveal a state-
ment of public-interest theory that offers much promise
either as a guide to public officials who are supposed
to make decisions in the public interest, or to research
scholars who might wish to investigate the extent to
which governmental decisions are empirically made in the
public interest." [41]
Walter Lippman described the essence of this rejection
of the concept of the public interest in his essay, "The
Public Philosophy." He characterized this approach (with
which he vehemently disagreed) as follows;
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"There are those who would say, using the words of philos-
ophers to prove it, that it is the characteristic illusion
of the tender-minded that they believe in philosophy.
Those who can do; those who cannot teach and theorize.
And being theorists by profession, they exaggerate the
efficacy of ideas, which are mere airy nothings without
mass or energy, the mere shadows of the existential world
of substance and of force, of habits and desires, of
machines and armies," 1423
This philosophic approach described by Lippman is representa-
tive of a certain kind of intellect. It belongs to the doers,
the men of action who have little patience for abstract ideas.
If the public interest cannot be defined in some clear, usable
fashion, then this intellect dismisses it.
This rejection of the concept of the public interest has
a certain appeal to those who pride themselves on being
realists and on being practical. It avoids the central problem
which confronts all positive theories of the public interest
as a meaningful entity - the necessity to define it in terms
broad enough to gain a consensus, yet specific enough to
point toward concrete policies. Proponents of this modern
approach have concluded that this problem is insolvable, and
have relegated the concept of the public interest to the
category of interesting but useless abstractions,
One political scientist who is critical of the rejection
of the public interest is Richard Flathman. He argues,
"the 'abandon public interest 1 school of thought is not
concerned with politics or justification at all, but
with a more tender growth known as political science.
Desiring to turn political science into a hard science
on their model of the natural sciences, these writers
wish to cut away all concepts, questions, and concerns
which, in their view, hold political science back from
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this goal. Political science ought to eschew value judg-
ments and cut away all concepts stricken with the cancer
of ambiguity and imprecision generated by value judgments.
If politicians, journalists, or citizens wish to concern
themselves with the public interest, political scientists
will not object. But the discipline itself must remain
pure and exclude from its conceptual apparatus such pre-
scientific curiosities." {43] (Emphasis in the original.)
Flathman's observation exposes the shallowness of the
rejection of the public interest. While this self-styled
"tough-minded" approach can present some formidable obstacles
to any concept of the public interest, it overlooks a funda-
mental reality of the American political system. "Politicians,
journalists, and citizens" do concern themselves with the
public interest; this concern has substantially influenced
the evolution of both American society itself, and its insti-
tutions, particularly the institutions of government. To
the present day, the public interest is cited as the justifica-
tion for innumerable laws and government activities. If we
abandon this concept, as a myth exposed by modern scientific
wisdom, what shall be put in its place as the yardstick by
which the legitimacy of policy is measured? This is the
fatal flaw of the rejectionist critique of the concept of the
public interest - it creates a vacuum in the American theory
of government and offers nothing with which to fill that
vacuum.
In one of the most recent attempts to restore meaning
to the concept of the public interest, William Meyer advances
another argument for rejecting the abandonment of the public
interest. Citing Herbert Marcuse's suggestion that a critical
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distinction must be made between functional and operational
concepts and cognitive concepts, Meyer reveals the fundamental
weakness of the functional treatment of the public interest:
"Indeed, the operationalist treatment of the public
interest does seem to wipe away the historical struggles
with which liberal thought has been confronted: the
problem of universal and particular, individual and
collective, Rousseau's general will standing in opposition
to Bentham's sum of particular wills. The assertion of
a public interest no longer stands as a possible threat
to liberalism, since empirical science has offered the
choice of treating the concept in its merely functional
dimensions or else dismissing it with impunity." [44]
The recently increased criticism by theorists such as
Marcuse and Meyer highlight the inadequacy of attempting to
restrict a cognitive concept, such as the public interest,
to purely functional, empirical, or operational modes of
political analysis. Perhaps rejection of the public interest
as a meaningful entity can be supported on the basis of the
evidence that can be rationally measured and quantified. Yet
it is non-quantifiable values which comprise the essence of
the American Dream. That Dream is government by and for
the people, with equal opportunity for all to participate.
If that goal is to be realized, some concept of what is in
the people's interest must be attempted. No matter how
difficult it may be, we dare not throw away the concept of
the public interest. If we discard this concept as a myth,
then the American Dream itself is equally a myth.
Even more than the thoughtful citizen or the policy-
maker, the strategic planner cannot afford to be persuaded
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to reject the concept of the public interest. The existence
of some public interest, whether it can be defined with
clarity or only vaguely, is the basic rationale for strategic
planning. Without this cognitive concept as a foundation,
there can be no point in expending efforts on planning the
future. If the planner can operationalize the concept, his
task will be made easier and more objective; if, because of
the difficulty in operationalizing it, he dismisses the concept
as meaningless, his efforts lack any basic justification.
E. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS A MULTIPLE CONCEPT
Thus far, this discussion of contemporary theories of
the public interest has focused upon unitary concepts,
theories which are wholly committed to substantive, procedural,
or rejectionist philosophies. There is additionally a philos-
ophic approach which borrows something from all of these
concepts. This synthesis draws upon the apparent truths and
utility of all the other approaches.
This attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with
concepts of the public interest which can be valid at all
levels of analysis concludes that only a multiple concept
can resolve all of the dilemmas. This approach recognizes
that the public interest has unique meanings on different
operational planes, but sees this as no cause to reject the
concept in its entirety.
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This more complex conceptualization of the public interest
more accurately reflects the real world in which policy is
made and strategic planning must be conducted. It is a world
of multiple effects; seldom, if ever, does a single-factor
analysis capture the essence of any political situation or
decision. Additionally, the multiple concept approach appeals
to common sense. A philosophic theory which recognizes that
a fundamental difference exists between the public interest
in defending the nation against attack and the public interest
in preserving the snail-darter, but that nonetheless, both of
these problems do engage some level of public concern, gains
substantial credibility.
An excellent example of the multiple concept approach is
provided by Schubert's analysis of the public interest as a
function of the societal role being played [45] . In this
analysis, which does him greater credit than his previously
cited total rejection of the concept, the role being filled
determines how the public interest will be operationalized
and defined. For example, while a social planner may con-
ceptualize the public interest in terms of some normative
'common good' of the community, officials in mediation roles
have reference only to procedures sanctioned by accepted
legal or political process. In both cases, the public in-
terest provides the basis for decision, but it is two
different concepts of the public interest which are applied.
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This analysis by Schubert points up the great advantage
of viewing the public interest as a multiple concept; it
permits the entire spectrum of philosophic constructs to be
utilized. Normative values, where appropriate, can provide
the basis for policy decisions. If normative values are
unclear, or lead to fragmentation, decisions can be made on
the basis of the aggregationist concept of the public interest.
If no substantive concept is attainable, a reliance upon
accepted democratic procedures can still provide some degree
of legitimacy to policy decisions.
For the official concerned with the formulation of policy,
this multiple concept approach offers the most useful philo-
sophic framework. It does not solve the problem of defining
the public interest, because it leaves the decision-maker the
task of determining what concept of the public interest is
appropriate for the given problematic situation. What it
does do is give the policy-maker the flexibility to utilize
the concept that is most appropriate to the circumstances and
retain a basis for legitimacy.
The problem of the public interest which the strategic
planner must resolve is somewhat different. Unlike the policy-
maker, the planner has no concrete problematic situation with-
in which the public interest must be perceived. His
environment is dominated by uncertainty, with little other
than abstract principles to serve as a guide. For that reason,
the planner is more apt to be forced to rely on some form of
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normative conception than is the policy-maker. However, he
needs to be aware of the other conceptions described in this
chapter in order that they may be utilized when appropriate.
Before concluding this survey of contemporary concepts
of the public interest, one additional observation is worthy
of comment. This concerns an evolutionary pattern which
seems to be present in the body of philosophic literature
which addresses the public interest. The evolution of this
concept appears to follow the Weberian model of history, an
evolution from a sacred to a secular orientation, from a
framework of absolutes to a framework of relativity.
Early treatments of the public interest all revolved
around normative ideals and natural laws. Divine will played
the largest role in conceptions of what constituted the public
interest. Later, as humanism superceded ecclesiasticism, this
approach gave way to the aggregationist concept of
Utilitarianism. As absolutes continued to lose credibility
under the onslaught of modern science, the procedural concept
appeared and became dominant. In what might well be called
the Age of Skepticism, theorists began to reject the concept
of the public interest completely, and classify it as a myth
which is irrelevant to modern society.
Unlike biological evolution, the process of evolution in
ideas does not destroy old life forms as new ones become
dominant. In the contemporary dialogue on the public interest,
all points of view, from normative absolutes to complete
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rejection, are represented. No rationale similar to the sur-
vival of the fittest exists which would prove that the more
recent developments are in any way superior to earlier
conceptions.
The idea of the public interest as an evolutionary process
poses an intriguing subject for speculation and a possible
hypothesis for further study. The hypothesis is this: that
a causal relationship exists between the way in which the
public interest has been conceptualized and man's expanding
knowledge of human behavior and cultural diversity. The
sciences of psychology and anthropology have greatly increased
our awareness of the complexity of human needs and the dif-
ferent ways in which various cultures have addressed those
needs. Perhaps the increasing indeterminacy of the concept
of the public interest is no more than a reflection of that
greater awareness of the complexity of the problem.
This chapter has provided an overview of how contemporary
theories view the essential nature of the public interest.
The inability to select any one of these competing concepts
as the correct philosophic framework for defining the content
of the national interest is the first of two major problems
which created the confusion which surrounds the concept.
The following chapter will discuss the second area of dispute
which resulted in this unfortunate state of affairs.
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IV. IDEALISTS AND REALISTS: A DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF
The second issue of controversy which has precluded con-
sensus on the national interest has been the subject of a
debate that is as ancient as philosophy, perhaps as old as
human history itself. The two points of view represented
in this debate have been variously labelled idealism and
realism, utopianism and realpolitik , visionary politics and
power politics, and morality and self-interest. Whatever
labels are applied, these two viewpoints comprise fundamentally
opposing belief systems about the basic nature of man, and
consequently, the nature of the relations between men and
between their political organizations, nation-states.
Four hundred years before the birth of Christ, Thucydides
described how this eternal conflict was given expression in
ancient Greece during the Peloponesian War. Pericles pro-
claimed in his famous funeral oration that Athens alone obeyed
the dictates of the highest morality because "When we do kind-
nesses to others, we do not do them out of any calculation of
profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, relying on
our free liberality" [46]. Despite this declaration of adher-
ence to morality, power politics made its presence felt in the
negotiations between Athens and the small Spartan colony of
Melos, Facing Melos with a powerful fleet, the Athenian repre-
sentatives reminded the Council of the Melians about the
realities of power in terms that were painfully blunt:
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"Athenians: ... if you have met here for any other reason
except to look the facts in the face and on the basis of
these facts to consider how you can save your city from
destruction, there is no point in our going on with this
discussion.
[Melian assent.]
Athenians: Then we on our side will use no fine phrases
... a great mass of words that nobody would believe . .
.
Instead we recommend that you should try to get what is
possible for you to get, taking into consideration what
we both really do think; since you know as well as we
do that, when these matters are discussed by practical
people, the standard of justice depends on the equality
of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they
have to accept." [47]
The conflict between obedience to moral ideals and the
expedience of using naked power in the service of self-
interest is as much a part of the American historical expe-
rience as it was that of Athens. This tension between realism
and idealism was, in fact, present at the very origin of the
nation. In what remains the classic study of the beginnings
of American foreign policy, Felix Gilbert described two oppos-
ing motivations that inspired 17th century settlers to make
the voyage from Europe to the New World [48]. Alongside those
with an idealistic urge toward a new Utopian social order
based upon liberty, equality, and religious freedom, came
those motivated by the more pragmatic appeal of the profits
to be gained from trade between the New World and the Old.
From this beginning to the present day, the conflict between
those who believe that America's destiny is to act as the
champion of certain moral principles and those, equally
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sincere, who believe that the nation's policies must recog-
nize and be derived from the realities of the distribution
of power has been a constant thread in the fabric of American
foreign policy.
This debate became particularly heated in the aftermath
of World War II, and continued to dominate political analysis
during the first half of the 1950 's. There are a number of
reasons why the experience of a great global war gave added
currency to the age-old argument between realists and
idealists. The maximum national effort engendered by the war
was made possible only by the characterization of the Allied
cause as a moral crusade against evil. As described by
Godfrey Hodgson, "The sleeping energies of the American sense
of mission were turned outward to the world" [49] . With
victory in 1945 came a renaissance of the kind of moralistic
foreign policy that had not characterized American political
beliefs since the era of Woodrow Wilson, In the words of
contemporary observer T. H. White,
"The imperative legacy of Virtue also descended from the
war. As Eisenhower's divisions tore open the Nazi con-
centration camps, Americans realized for the first time
how deep human depravity could go. They accepted in
their policies the moral mandate not to let such evil
happen again." [50]
The same public awakening was described by Hodgson in his
account of American in Our Time ; he wrote, "In 194 5, a deep
sense of the historical mission of the United States came to
fruition in the public mind" [51]. Explaining how this
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awakening affected America's post-war foreign policies, he
continued:
"The same sense of religious duty, of a call to take sides
in a Manichean conflict between the forces of light and
the forces of darkness, runs through the whole history of
American foreign policy since 1947" [52].
These observations by contemporary observers of the post-
war resurgence of idealism as the basis of American foreign
policy tell only half the story of the effects of the war
on the debate between realism and idealism. At the same time,
a number of political theorists, such as Hans J. Morganthau
and Robert Osgood were re-emphasizing the necessity to make
American foreign policy match the realities of international
power politics. These realists also derived lessons from
World War II to support their position.
They cited America's retreat into isolationism following
the First World War as a primary contributing factor to the
rise of totalitarianism in Europe, and traced this isolation-
ist sentiment directly to the disillusionment with Woodrow
Wilson's attempt to inject American ideals into world poltiics.
In their view, morality as the basis of policy had been tried,
and had proven to be a cataclysmic failure. Additionally, they
expressed the concern that America's declared aims in the
post-war era far exceeded her grasp, and urged that a more
realistic appraisal of national interests be the foundation
of policy.
The essence of this national debate was summarized by
Hodgson:
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"After World War II, in almost every department of intel-
lectual life, the doctrine of 'American exceptionalism'
revived. At the same time, utilitarian doctrines, stres-
sing that morality in politics was an illusion, undercut
the moralistic basis of left-wing politics." 153]
The conflict between idealism and realism was the dominant
concern of political theorists until about 1955. (Or to put
it in the vernacular of the day, it was the conflict between
the doctrine of "American exceptionalism" and the search for
value-free politics.) At about that time, the debate "was
won by the realists," according to Fred Sonderman, "but the
victory was transient" [54J .
After almost two decades of quiescence, this issue re-
turned to the forefront of American politics in the aftermath
of Vietnam and Watergate. The 1976 Presidential campaign, and
the subsequent administration of Jimmy Carter was, above all,
about the effort to restore American ideals and a sense of
morality to the nation's policies. T. H. White described the
vision that motivated this shift away from realism, and its
attendant problems:
"Underlying the vision of the world as seen by Carter was
the same moral rightousness that had inspired Woodrow
Wilson half a century earlier and had been repudiated
after the First World War, not only by America's allies
but by America's Senate. And underlying all was the funda-
mental flaw in the traditional ' rightous ' foreign policy -
the inability to distinguish between American ideals and
American interests, which rarely coincide" [55].
Hans Morganthau, considered by many to be the foremost
apostle of the realistic concept of the national interest as
the focal point of the nation's foreign policy, anticipated by
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a quarter of a century the kind of arguments that would be
raised against Carter's conception of the national interest.
He wrote, "A foreign policy derived from the national interest
is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by
universal moral principles" [56] . While this precept has a
certain pragmatic appeal, it evades the central dilemma that
has been at the center of the debate between realists and
idealists. That dilemma is simply stated: What is the role
of American ideals and moral values in defining the national
interest?
Those responsible for the formulation and conduct of
America's foreign policy, as well as the nation's strategic
planners, must answer that question, at least to their own
satisfaction, if not that of the public. Morganthau's realis-
tic theory does not help solve this dilemma; moreover, it
introduces an artificial dichotomy between the concept of the
national interest and the moral values which are held by the
majority of American citizens. In order to be useful, a
theory of the national interest must reconcile, not separate,
these two quantities.
To be fair to Morganthau, and his like-minded contem-
poraries, it must be pointed out that he arrived at his famous
prescription for the national interest as the "mainspring of
American foreign policy" [57] within a particular historical
context. That context was the post-war international environ-
ment, which presented American policy-makers with a myriad of
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complex challenges, Morganthau's dictum was less a theory for
all time and circumstances than it was a plea to avoid a
relapse into a kind of Wilsonian idealism that would ignore
the real power relationships that existed at the end of the
war. He was writing in response to what he (and others) per-
ceived as an over-reliance in the pre-war era upon moral prin-
ciples as determinants of policy , and a danger that the same
trend would continue in the more dangerous post-war period.
It is no accident that the other single most influential
modern study of the national interest (Osgood's Ideals and
Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations; The Great
Transformation of the Twentieth Century ) was a product of the
same historical context, and came to essentially the same
conclusion - that American foreign policy required a large
injection of realism.
Three decades have now passed since these landmark studies
first appeared. Throughout this period, both government and
academic circles have largely been dominated by disciples of
Morganthau and Osgood (with the exception of the Carter aber-
ration mentioned previously) . National interests and the
nation's foreign policy have been formulated on the basis of
what can be quantified and measured, with only sporadic atten-
tion paid to the less tangible quantities of ideals and moral
values. As American society has become increasingly secular-
ized, it has become more and more difficult to generate any
serious discussion on the role of traditional American values
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in defining the national interest. In most academic environ-
ments, the credibility of the idealist position and of norma-
tive theory in general has so far declined that even to
attempt such a discussion is considered a sign of either
hopeless naivety or ignorance. However, although the realist
viewpoint has dominated in recent decades, the issue has not
been satisfactorily resolved, and will continue to be a factor
in the debate over the concept of the national interest.
The decision to examine the arguments of idealism and
realism as they relate to the concept of the national interest
was made with full awareness that most scholars consider this
debate a dead issue, and with an equal appreciation of the
difficulties of addressing what is essentially a question of
philosophic preference. However, two pragmatic considerations
account for the decision to proceed, in spite of these dif-
ficulties, with an exploration of the relationship between
intangible moral values and concrete realistic interests as
co-determinants of the national interest.
The first is the conviction that the issue of ideals and
self-interests requires re-examination in light of the histor-
ical events and American political developments of the quarter-
century since the "victory" of the realists. To a great
extent, the cultural revolution which this nation sustained
during the 1960's was a rejection of purely realistic policies,
and a demand for recognition of certain moral principles in
the formulation of national policy. The second is the belief
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that this philosophic issue is most germane specifically to
strategic planners; more than any other governmental activity,
the attempt to look into the future and fashion strategies
to cope with that future, demands an understanding and ap-
preciation of the values and principles which give this country
its unique identity. Until the planner resolves the role of
idealism in determining the future direction of the nation,
he is too much like the shipwrecked mariner, trying to set a
course with half the rudder gone.
The following discussion of the realist and the idealist
arguments can, of course, do little more than touch upon the
highlights of each position. The intent of this chapter is
to illustrate how each of these two philosophic belief sys-
tems leads to a different conception of the national interest,
and how this dichotomy has contributed to the nation's in-
ability to articulate a clear concept of that interest.
A. THE IDEALIST POSITION
Idealism is both a particular set of epistomological
assumptions and an expression of belief in the validity of
abstract moral principles as the correct foundation of
national policy. Although these two uses of the term are
separate and distinct, the second derives from the first to
a greater extent than is frequently recognized. In this
brief exposition of the idealist concept of the national
interest, it will first be necessary to explain the
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epistomological meaning of the term, prior to describing how
that set of assumptions has been given expression in defining
the national interest.
The prime assumption of Idealism is that being is spirit,
which yields an other-worldly view of reality. Empiricism is
rejected as a viable philosophy of knowledge, with intuition
or revelation seen as the only true path to knowledge of
reality. For the greater part of Western civilization, this
philosophy was the dominant mode of thought about political
theory. One of the earliest recorded expressions of this
world view was Platonism, which held that the real world
existed beyond the reach of men, and that only an imperfect
reflection of that reality could be perceived through human
experience. Modern Idealism traces its roots to the German
philosopher Hegel, who developed a comprehensive, internally
consistent system of thought based upon the ideal of the
universe as spirit, and nations as the reflection of that
spirit.
From Idealism's first assumption derive social, political,
and economic theories which are based upon some type of
specialized knowledge which is available only to an elite
few. The Divine Right of Kings was one of the practical
concepts which arose out of the Idealist philosophy. Through-
out history, including our own century, Idealism has had a
powerful appeal, because it affirms certain humanistic values,
concepts of transcendence, and God, which are beyond
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existential human verification. However, the same belief in
abstract absolutes has served as the foundation for fascist
and dictatorial state philosophies, such as German Nazism in
the 1930's and 1940's.
The link between this philosophic mode of thought and a
particular approach to defining the national interest is in
the belief that certain moral principles are a more accurate
reflection of reality than are visible, verifiable human per-
ceptions of existential realities. Attempting to provide an
operational definition for this approach to international
politics, Edward H. Carr defined it as the recognition of,
and adherence to "an international stock of common ideas,
however limited and weakly held, to which appeal can be made,
and a belief that these common ideas stand somehow in the
scale of values above national interests" [58]. In the
American political context, this belief has been given expres-
sion in such concepts as American exceptionalism, manifest
destiny, and the missionary impulse.
American idealists have developed variously phrased
justifications for this missionary impulse. Some have viewed
the American experiment as the unfolding of a plan that in-
cluded the nation, yet was greater than the nation, that the
fundamental principles of the American Republic were prin-
ciples of universal significance and application. Some have
seen American history as the revelation of a Divine plan,
while others have viewed it as the logical development of
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natural laws. In all of these idealistic conceptions of the
meaning of the American experiment, it has been emphasized
that the United States either has represented, or should
represent, the good life for all men everywhere, that at no
time have the American people been thinking or acting for
themselves alone.
In an attempt to describe the national style of American
foreign relations, Knud Krakau listed a number of basic
assumptions that have undergirded America's approach to foreign
policy [59] . The first two of these basic assumptions have
been central in the beliefs of American idealism. The first
is the idea that the American experiment represented a new
beginning for mankind, which spawned the concepts of the
separateness and exceptionalism of American existence. This
feeling of exceptionalism has supported policies of both
active internationalism, by which American ideals are force-
fully impressed upon less progressive societies, and isola-
tionism, by which America simply serves as a passive example
of moral conduct for less morally developed nations.
The second basic assumption underlying American idealism
is the liberal outlook which derives from the Lockean polit-
ical tradition. According to this view, the international
system is not chaos, but a rudimentary order subject to the
laws of reason. Reasonable men are able to discern this
order, and act in such a manner as to foster it. From this
assumption derives the concept of a natural harmony of
65
interests among nations, which leads to the idea that inter-
national peace is the normal state of affairs, and aggression
and war an aberration. Any nation which initiates aggres-
sion is upsetting the natural order of the international sys-
tem as well as violating the law of reason, and may therefore
be destroyed by the defenders of that natural order with
complete moral justification.
These theories attempt to explain the motivation for and
the basic assumptions of American idealism, with its funda-
mental premise of a moral international community. The other
key component of this approach to the national interest con-
sists of the definition of the specific ideals which Americans
have made central tenets of their faith. These beliefs have
been powerful enough to inspire Americans to fight for their
propagation, and even to place the national existence in
jeopardy on their behalf. Charles Frankel has categorized
these ideals under four general headings, which taken together,
constitute the democratic bias of American foreign policy [60].
The first is the ideal of the consent of the governed.
This is the mechanism by which the line between those who
command and those who must obey is softened and made "emotion-
ally and morally digestible" {61] . Inherent in this concept
is the model of democratic consensus, in which all groups and
individuals have the opportunity to voice their preferences
and exert some influence upon the formulation of policies
which they will be obliged to support.
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Closely related to the principle of government by consent
is the ideal of the open society. This concept implies that
all arrangements and policies of a democratic society are
open to question, and that those who criticize what exists
and strive for other possibilities are entitled to the same
rights and protection that is granted to those who are satis-
fied with the status quo. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. expressed the essence of the open society
in one of his justly famous dissenting opinions:
"When men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out." [62]
In this open society, loyalty is given to the existing social
order precisely because it is permitted to criticize and work
to change it. Finally, it assumes that criticism is the
necessary prelude to corrective action which will make the
society continue to become better for all.
These first two ideals lead to what is undoubtedly the
most important tenet of the democratic faith - the autonomy
of the individual. The essence of the American Dream is the
belief that any person can hold an expectation of life which
is limited only by his own tastes and talents; in other types
of societies, such an expectation was accessable only to an
elite priviliged class. Although the Dream is not without
limits, it gives its believers, more generously than any
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other political system, the opportunity to define their own
goals and, within reason, to seek their own ideals.
The final principle which is central to the idealist ap-
proach is the concept of responsible government. Like a
responsible individual, such a government knows and observes
its limits. It conducts its affairs in accordance with the
rule of law and with respect for the basic rights of its
citizens, as well as the universal human rights of all
citizens of the world. Additionally, it is a responsive
government, alert to the legitimate needs and desires of
those it governs. Finally, it is government that is account-
able for its actions to that same constituency.
This set of fundamental ideals suggested by Frankel is
just one of numerous attempts to describe the basic beliefs
which the American missionary spirit has attempted to spread
throughout the rest of the world. Other categorizations are
available, some more general, many more specific. For any
given era of American diplomacy, there have been accepted
phrases and definitions which have elicited support from the
idealistic segment of both the population at large and the
policy-making elite.
What is important, however, to understanding the influence
of the idealist tradition upon the concept of the national
interest, is not the specific expression of particular ideals,
but the notion that some ideals, as abstract principles, are
more important to the welfare of the nation than are concrete
68
gains and losses in the material sense. The idealist con-
ceptualization of the national interest begins with the
assumption that perceived realities of international politics
do not provide as true a guide to American policy as does
adherence to these fundamental beliefs.
This assumption is why, throughout American diplomatic
history "good will and good intentions would prevail over
the realities" [63]. The quintessential attitude of the
American idealist was captured by de Toqueville, and quoted
by Lyndon Johnson as President:
"Forever seeking, forever falling to rise again, often
disappointed but not discouraged, he tends unceasingly
towards that unmeasured greatness so indistinctly visible
at the end of the long track" [64].
A less transcendental but more applied expression of
America's idealism was provided by Harry Truman, considered
by most historians to be hard-headed realist. In the doctrine
of foreign relations which bears his name, he stated, "One
of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United
States is the creation of conditions in which we and other
nations will be able to work out a way of life free from
coercion" [65] . This theme is at the heart of American
idealism - that this nation has the responsibility (and there-
fore capability is assumed) to shape not only the inter-
national environment, but also the domestic conditions within
other nations so that all may participate in the American
Dream. The difficulties inherent in this self-appointed task,
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and the uncertainty that the capability to complete it does
exist, constitute the fundamental weakness of idealism, and
provide the point of attack for the opposing realist con-
ceptualization of the national interest.
B. THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF IDEALISM
Like idealism, political realism derives from a partic-
ular metaphysical system of thought. This world view is most
commonly called Materialism, and it bears the same episto-
mological relationship to political realism as does the
philosophy of Idealism to the moralistic or idealistic
approach to politics. A brief description of the philosophic
underpinnings of the realist approach to the national interest
will be followed by an examination of the assumptions of this
approach.
The fundamental tenet of Materialism is that all reality
is matter, from which it follows that all knowledge must be
empirically based. Any belief derived from the intuitive,
spiritual, or transcendental is dismissed; thus abstract
moral principles are denied as an accurate reflection of
reality. Only that which can be perceived and experienced
through the human senses is admitted as true. Unlike Ideal-
ism, which postulates specialized knowledge available only
to an elite few, Materialism is democratic, in that it is
based upon an appeal to the senses that can be experienced
by all.
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Although the principles of political realism were
familiar in the ancient Hellenic world, as evidenced by the
earlier citation from Thucydides , the origins of modern
realism are found in the break-up of the medieval system.
For centuries, under the supremacy of the Roman Empire and
later the Catholic Church, the political good, first of the
Empire and then of the church, could be and was equated with
the moral good. However, once the supremacy of the church
was successfully challenged, the divergence between political
theory, based upon moral precepts, and political practice,
based upon perceptions of real interests, became ever more
acute and challenging.
The first political theorist in this era of disintegra-
tion who attempted to reconsider the whole question of theory
and practice was Machiavelli . In stating his rationale, he
wrote,
"... it appears to be more appropriate to follow up the
real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for
many have pictured republics and principalities which
in fact have never been seen and known, because how one
lives is so far distant from how one ought to live that
he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done
sooner effects his ruin than his preservation." [66]
Three fundamental tenets implicit in the political doc-
trine revealed by Machiavelli constitute the foundation of
political realism. First, history is a sequence of cause
and effect, the course of which can be perceived and under-
stood through intellectual effort, but not (as the Idealists
believed) through imagination or revelation. This idea of
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causation was the first substitution of reason for Divine
supervision and occasional intervention as the motive force
of history. Second, contrary to Utopian beliefs, political
practice creates theory, rather than the other way around.
Lastly, politics are not (as Idealists assert) a function of
ethics, but ethics derive from politics. Opposing power, not
morality, is what constrains men to act in a certain manner;
morality is merely an invention of theorists to give human
behavior a more self-gratifying set of movitations. Machia-
velli recognized the influence of morality, but believed that
there could be no effective morality in the absence of effec-
tive authority, which was the product of power.
Subsequent political philosophers contributed further to
the realist conception of politics. Bacon praised Machiavelli
for "saying openly and without hypocrisy what men are in the
habit of doing, not what they ought to do" [67] . Bodin in
France, developing a theory of sovereignty, Hobbes in England,
exploring the basic nature of man, and Spinoza in the Nether-
lands, attempting to identify the laws of nature, all built
upon the premises of Machiavelli in constructing their
theoretical analyses of politics. John Locke demonstrated
the empirical foundation of knowledge in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding . He argued that the concept of innate
principles (i.e., those which inspire the universal assent
of mankind) is contrary to the reality of the actual world,
and therefore cannot be true 168], Locke's rejection of
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the validity of innate principles was one of the most import-
ant steps toward the philosophy of Materialism.
A comprehensive theory of determinism as a rational
historic process was provided by Hegel, who found its direct-
ing force in a metaphysical abstraction (spirit) . However,
it was only a short step to transform this abstraction into
a concrete material force. In the works of Marx and Engels,
this material force which explained the march of history was
economics
.
Economic determinism was not the only interpretation of
history advanced to explode the myth of universal abstract
principles, however. Buckle propounded a geopolitical inter-
pretation which argued that human affairs were "permeated
by one glorious principle of universal and undeviating
regularity," the role of geography as "a political categorical
imperative" [69] . This theory would find a modern echo in
the geopolitical analysis of Sir Halford Mackinder. Oswald
Spengler offered quasi-biological laws as the determinants
of the rise and decline of civilizations. More ecclectic
thinkers saw history as the product of the interaction among
a variety of material factors. As Secretary of State, Charles
Evans Hughes gave practical expression to this realist inter-
pretation of why nations pursue particular policies:
"Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. They
are the result of national interest arising from some
immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical
perspective." [70]
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From Machiavelli and Hobbes, political realists take the
premise that men, and thus nations, are motivated by self-
interest; they view the struggle for national power as the
central theorem of international politics, and are skeptical
of attempts to mitigate this struggle for power through
appeals to moral principles or universal ideals. One of the
more concise expositions of political realism was provided
7by Hans Morganthau, who offered these six principles:
(1) Politics, like society in general, is governed by
objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
The operation of these laws is impervious to human
preferences or desires, and those who challenge them
are doomed to fail. Realism asserts the possibility
of developing rational theory which reflects the
objective laws of politics; the role of this theory is
to distinguish between what is true objectively, sup-
ported by evidence and reason, and what is only subjec-
tive judgment, informed by prejudice and wishful
thinking.
(.2) The concept which provides the most useful signpost
in mapping the confused landscape of international
politics is the idea of interest defined in terms of
power. The evidence of history bears out the assump-
tion that statesmen think in terms of this concept.
A realist theory of politics, with this concept as
its basis, guards against two common fallacies;
concern with the motives of individual statesmen,
and concern with ideological preferences.
(.3) Realism does not endow its central concept of interest
defined as power with a meaning that is fixed for all
time. The kind of interest determining political
action depends upon the political and cultural context
of a particular period of history. The contemporary
conditions under which foreign policy operates can be
changed, but only through the skillful manipulation of
the forces that have shaped history, not by confront-
ing those forces with abstract ideals which refuse to
take the objective laws of politics into account.
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(4) Political realism recognizes the moral significance
of political action, and recognizes the tension
between moral command and the requirements of success-
ful political action. However, realism maintains that
moral principles cannot be applied to actions of na-
tions in an abstract universal formulation, but must
be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time
and place.
(.5) Moreover, realism refuses to identify the moral
aspirations of a particular nation with the moral
laws that govern the universe. It is exactly the
concept of interest defined in terms of power that
allows us to avoid the folly of moral excess, and to
treat all nations, pursueing their own interest, with
even-handed justice.
(6) The difference between political realism and all other
schools of political thought is both real and profound.
The question which the realist always must ask about
any political action is "How does this policy affect
the power of the nation?" Although the realist is
aware of the relevance of other standards, such as
moral and legal principles, he must subordinate them
to this one overriding consideration.
The realist critique of idealistic belief in universal
moral principles was summarized in Carr's description of this
approach to international politics: "International order and
international solidarity," he wrote, "will always be slogans
of those who feel strong enough to impose them on others" [71]
.
He continued, "What matters is that these supposedly absolute
and universal principles were not principles at all, but the
unconscious reflections of national policy based on a partic-
ular interpretation of national interest at a particular
time" [72]. Political realism does not deny the possibility
of morality in policy, but denies the validity of morality
as the basis for policy. The only correct basis is a calcu-
lation of the consequences of policy for the power of the
nation, or in other words, for the genuine national interest.
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The contrast between the idealist conceptualization of
the national interest and this more realistic appreciation
of what constitutes the genuine interest of the nation was
clearly illustrated by one of America's first political
realists, Alexander Hamilton. The background was the European
coalition against revolutionary France arranged in 1792; the
following year, President George Washington had proclaimed
American neutrality in this struggle, against the wishes of
a large segment of public opinion which demanded that the
United States go to the aid of France. Among the arguments
against the proclamation of neutrality were three derived
from moral principles; these were (1) faithfulness to treaty
obligations, (2) gratitude to France for assistance provided
to the colonies during the war for independence, and (3) a
natural affinity of the republican United States with the
republican institutions of France. Hamilton countered these
moral arguments with a clear statement of the national
interest
:
"There would be no proportion between the mischiefs and
perils to which the United States would expose themselves
by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the nature
of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that
which it would be in their power actually to render her
by becoming a party . .
.
Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation; and
though in the performance of stipulations relating to
war, good faith requires that its ordinary hazards should
be fairly met, because they are directly contemplated by
such stipulations, yet it does not require that extra-
ordinary and extreme hazards should be run." [73J
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Hamilton proceeded to answer each of the moral arguments
which favored American involvement in terms of the real risks
and benefits entailed. He placed the issue into the context
of the concrete power situation in which the United States
existed at the time, and found that the national interest
of the country demanded American neutrality.
According to political realists (exemplified by Morganthau)
reasoning such as Alexander Hamilton's, which openly recognized
the objective laws of politics, guided American policy only as
long as the Federalists remained in power. From the admin-
istrations of Thomas Jefferson onward, American statesmen have
sought to justify their actions in moral terms, yet their ac-
tions have been dominated by considerations of power and
national interest. For over a century however, by felicitous
coincidence, what moral law demanded was always identical
with what the national interest seemed to require [74]. Thus,
even though political thought and political action tended to
occupy different planes, the end result of both pointed to
the same policies.
It was when moral principle and apparent national interest
clearly diverged, which Morganthau places at the initiation
of the American move outside this hemisphere at the end of the
Spanish-American War, that the idealist conception of the
national interest began to lead the nation into trouble.
Rather than justifying the enduring national interest, moral
principles replaced it as the guide to action. The ultimate
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failure of Wilsonian visionary policies, and the high costs
of the subsequent retreat into isolationism, comprise an
eloquent statement requiring no elaboration as to the ef-
ficacy of this approach to foreign policy.
Yet, in the very attempt to overcome the flaws of ideal-
ism, a purely realistic approach to politics suffers from a
number of critical limitations. Carr found four missing
ingredients in consistent realism that are essential elements
of effective political thinking. These were "a finite goal,
an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment, and a ground
for action" 175] . Realism, despite its appeals to reason,
lacks the inspiration necessary to mobilize democratic com-
pliance and enthusiastic public support for its policies.
No better illustration of this weakness could be found than
the recent lack of success enjoyed by the ultimate believer
in realpolitik
,
Henry Kissinger; while his understanding of
America's interests may have been faultless, his inability
to give his policies an emotional appeal and a moral content
doomed him to failure. Moreover, pure realism shares many
characteristics with political cynicism; to many critics of
the realist approach, differences are matters of degree, not
substance. Cynicism is peculiarly alien to the American
political mentality, with its belief in progress, and thus,




C. REQUIRED; A SYNTHESIS
Recognition of the limitations of both idealism and real-
ism as the foundation of the national interest has led many
theorists to seek a synthesis of the two. Even the foremost
proponents of the realist philosophy have felt compelled to
qualify their statements with a bow to morality. Thus we
find in E . H. Carr:
"We return therefore to the conclusion that any sound
political thought must be based on elements of both
Utopia and reality. Where utopianism has become a
hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a
disguise for the interests of the privileged, the real-
ist performs an indispensable service in unmasking it.
But pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle
for power which makes any kind of international society
impossible
.
Here, then is the complexity, the fascination and the
tragedy of all political life . . . Every political situa-
tion contains mutually incompatible elements of Utopia
and reality, of moraltiy and power." [76]
Robert Osgood concludes his defense of self-interest as
the basis of foreign policy with the following;
"If the United States is to have a stable and effective
foreign policy, neither egoism nor altruism must inter-
fere with the rational, objective assessment of the real
long-run conditions of American self-interest; but this
does not mean that Americans should forsake their tradi-
tional idealism and relapse into cynicism or moral
apathy . .
.
... it is relevant to understand that the calculation
and pursuit of national self-interest without regard for
universal ideals is not only immoral but self-defeating.
Any assessment of the conditions for achieving a nation's
international ends which ignores this fact is
unrealistic." [77]
Even the high priest of political realism, Morganthau
,
compromises in the end, by stating that
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"The choice is not between moral principles and the
national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between
one set of moral principles, divorced from political
reality, and another set of moral principles, derived
from political reality." 178].
Thus, there is a consistent recognition that American
ideals have a place in the calculation of the national
interest, and that to ignore them is a sure road to failure.
Yet none of these theorists has advanced a theory which
attempts to clarify that role. The debate has continued
between realists and idealists, with neither side really
hearing the other, and neither working toward a solution to
the critical problem - defining the functional role of moral
values in the real world of the struggle for power.
Prior to attempting a resolution of this realist-idealist
dilemma in the context of strategic planning, and attempting
to answer the questions posed in the previous chapter concern-
ing the nature of the concept of the public interest itself,
it is necessary to consider what has been called the 'American
character. 1 In the most basic analysis, the public or na-
tional interest is that which maintains and enhances that
national character. The following chapter will examine the
development and characteristics of this national identity.
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V. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER
The very foundation of the national interest, the charac-
ter of the nation, is a continuously changing creation of
ideas interacting with experience. This chapter will examine
several factors which have made major contributions to the
nature of that character. The discussion begins with the
philosophic heritage of the European Age of Enlightenment,
which was transported to the New World by the early settlers.
The conflicting political philosophies and the compromises
reached to establish the new American government will then
be reviewed. The importance of the frontier experience,
particularly as embodied in the American West of the 19th
century, in the development of the national character will
be explored. America's original contribution to philosophic
theory, American Pragmatism, will be discussed. The chapter
then concludes with a look at the central philosophic prob-
lem of contemporary American political theory, the lack of a
recognized public philosophy.
A. THE EUROPEAN HERITAGE
During the 17th and 18th centuries, a revolution of ideas
swept Europe. What Alfred North Whitehead and Carl Becker
termed the "climate of opinion" 179] underwent a fundamental
and irrevocable change. The authoritative religious explana-
tion of the world and man's place in it which had dominated
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fifteen centuries of thought gave way to the Newtonian
universe of reason and scientific method. To realize the
magnitude of this transformation, one has only to compare the
Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas with Isaac Newton's
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy . The former,
postulated upon faith and Divine revelation is barely intel-
ligible to the twentieth century mind, let alone relevant;
the latter, as a statement of human learning and reason can
still be understood by anyone who cares to read it.
The Newtonian epistomological revolution marked a turning
point in the intellectual evolution of mankind. As Karl Popper
noted
,
"For those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge, para-
dise is lost . . . The more we try to return to the heroic
age of tribalism the more surely do we arrive at the
Inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticized
gangsterism. There is no return to a harmonious state of
nature. If we turn back, then we must go the whole way -
we must return to the beasts." [80]
When human reason and intellectual investigation replaced
a mysterious and unknowable Divine Being as the basic order-
ing principle of the universe, new realms were opened for
men's understanding. The Newtonian universe is above all a
rational universe - all events can be explained in terms of
natural causes. "To the same natural effect we must, as far
as possible, assign the same causes," {81] wrote Newton, and
with this statement, he established an entirely new episto-
mological framework for political theory. It offered man a
new vision of being able, first, to understand, and then to
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control his own destiny. Control over human destiny would
be the fruit of the knowledge provided by the new ordering
principle, scientific rationalism. The rational, knowable,
controllable Newtonian universe comprised the philosophic
climate of opinion in which the New World was settled, and
subsequently, the American Republic founded.
Newton's new conception of man's cosmological environment
ushered in the Age of Enlightenment in philosophy and political
theory. In essence, this new age was a methodical search for
the causes which would explain the effects perceived by men.
Men's relationship to one another and the proper role of the
state were placed under the microscope of reason and dis-
sected according to the scientific method. The central and
radical concept which emerged from this examination, and which
subsequently exerted the single greatest ideological influence
upon the shaping of American ideals, was the concept of
individualism. The focus upon the importance of the individ-
ual, and the associated concepts of natural rights which
developed from that focus, became the primary theme of polit-
ical theory. Where formerly the Divine Right of Kings had
preoccupied philosophers, their attention was now turned to
the individual common man as the elemental building block
of sovereignty.
In the previous chapter, it was shown how Machiavelli
initiated the attempt to reconcile political theory with
practice. The discussion of the problem of the public
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interest in the Age of Enlightenment can conveniently begin
with the ideas of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who
sought to find a compromise between Machiavelli ' s doctrine of
politics and a law of nature that would provide a supreme
ethical standard. His political theory represents the first
modern attempt to give an answer to the question of the right
order of society. It was he who first framed the issue of
the public interest as the question of the relationship of
individual desires to the interests of the society as a
whole.
Recognizing truth in Machiavelli ' s conceptualization of
politics, Hobbes wrote, "Before the names of Just and Unjust
can have place, there must be some coercive power" {82] . In
his analysis, all men are motivated by individual self-
interest. The state is the embodiment of the social contract
into which men enter for the purpose of protecting each
individual's self-interest from encroachment by other men.
The state, through the exercise of sovereignty, provides the
social order which allows men to pursue their individual
interests without fear. Only within a framework of social
order can freedom be achieved; without it, life would be "the
war of every man against every man" {83] . Hobbes concluded
that a state must be endowed with absolute sovereignty in
order to preserve the necessary degree of social order.
Hobbes believed that individual interests were in ir-
reconcilable conflict with the public interest. This aspect
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of his political theory created a dilemma - men could not be
free in the absence of social order, but this order neces-
sitated the surrender of freedom to an absolute sovereign.
Resolving this dilemma became the dominant preoccupation of
theorists who followed Hobbes. The tension between freedom
and order also would be one of the primary dilemmas of
democracy, not only for the framers of the American constitu-
tion, but for every generation of American statesmen who
followed them.
The most influential of the theorists who followed Hobbes
was John Locke. He resolved the Hobbesian dilemma by postu-
lating that men living together in community have certain
common, as well as conflicting interests. Additionally, he
introduced the assumption that the average man is rational
and just. With the addition of these two elements, Locke
could devise a new theory of government which accommodated
both freedom and order. His theory provided the first
(modern) formulation of the harmony of interests concept of
the public interest, and introduced the idea of government
based upon the consent of the governed [84]
.
Locke identified the natural rights of the individual as
the rights to life, liberty, and property. Like Hobbes, he
assumed that men enter into a social contract (the state) in
order to protect and preserve these natural rights; therefore,
the proper function of the state is to fulfill this protective
obligation. Locke's assumption of rationality led to the
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concept that men grant sovereignty to the state in order to
preserve their natural rights, through the mechanism of
consent. Since sovereignty is based upon this freely given
consent, Locke maintained that it could be withdrawn at any
time the sovereign failed to meet the legitimate expectations
of its citizens. (It must be noted that Locke's primary
purpose in writing his Second Treatise of Civil Government
,
in which he expounded the theory of consent, was to provide a
theoretical justification for the Glorious Revolution of
1688 [85].) The theory of consent, and the justification for
the withdrawl of consent, would provide the primary philo-
sophic rationale for the American Revolution almost a century
after Locke published the Second Treatise , and it would
remain one of the fundamental ideals of the American Dream,
Where Hobbes had stressed the necessity for the state to
exercise absolute sovereignty in order to preserve social
order, Locke's conception of rational and just men led to
the idea of limited government. Any authority beyond that
which is necessary to protect the natural rights of the
citizenry becomes an infringement upon the right to pursue
individual self-interest. The balance between Hobbes 's
emphasis on order and Locke's concern with the maximization
of individual freedom would provide a departure point and a
central theme for the debate over the structure of the
American government.
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The next major development in democratic political theory
was provided by Frenchman Jean Jacques Rousseau in The Social
Contract . Where Locke had postulated the existence of some
common interests existing concurrently with conflicting
individual interests, Rousseau argued that the two sets of
interests were in fact identical. Through the operation of
(his concept of) the General Will, conflict between individ-
ual interests and the public interest is always resolved in
favor of the common good. Because the individual gains so
many benefits in the transition from a state of nature to
the state of civilization, it is actually in the best interest
of the individual to further the good of the society which
makes civilization possible. Rousseau wrote,
"The passage from the state of nature to the civil state
produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting
justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions
the morality they had formerly lacked." [86]
Even though the individual may occasionally be tempted to
assert himself at the expense of the community, such action
is in fact contrary to his real interest.
Rousseau's concepts of the General Will and the common
good had a significant influence upon early American political
thought. His political theories were never accepted in their
entirety, because he was a bit too radical in his condemnation
of his age, but the American concept of the public interest
would ultimately adopt many of the characteristics of
Rousseau's model. His charge that "Man is born free; and
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everywhere he is in chains," [87] would be echoed in ever
broader definitions of freedom as the American experiment
unfolded, and the Dream became the goal for ever greater
numbers of people.
The philosophic evolution from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau
provided the predominant ideas of political theory during the
period preceding the birth of the American Republic. This,
of course, is a very abbreviated distillation of the ideas of
the Enlightenment; Harrington, Hume, Berkeley, Priestly,
Montesquieu - these and other political philosophers also
contributed ideas to the debate which would take place over
the form of government to be established in America. But
the key themes - the supremacy of the individual, his natural
rights, and the role of the state in ensuring those rights -
are to be found in the works of these three revolutionary
thinkers [88]
.
B. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY - THE FEDERALIST
DEBATE
When it became apparent that the newly independent
thirteen states required some form of central government
stronger than that provided under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, a debate was initiated that has continued to the present
day. The question at issue was how to preserve individual
liberty, for which the Revolution had been fought, while at
the same time endowing a central government with sufficient
authority to "promote the general welfare and secure the
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blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" [89]
.
This problem has been the essence of Constitutional disputes
throughout the nation's history, with different answers being
found by different generations of statesmen.
This thesis does not provide the scope for a detailed
treatment of the history of the United States Constitution,
and the compromises which were reached to produce the govern-
ment which was established thereby. However, the early
debate over that constitution encompasses the first explicit
attempt to define the national character; a brief review of
the major elements of the Federalist debates serves as a
useful introduction to that character.
In the most elemental analysis, the debate was between
men who adhered to the Hobbesian view of human nature, and
those who championed John Locke's belief in the rationality
and justice of the common man. In the former view, individual
self-interests are in irreconcilable conflict with the public
interest, leading inevitably to anarchy. A strong central
government vested with broad authority is required to pre-
serve order and protect the public interest. If, on the other
hand, Locke's assumptions are valid, the central government
must be limited in order to prevent the unjustified infringe-
ment of individual liberty.
Adherents to both of the above philosophic convictions
desired to establish a government structure which reflected
their own beliefs. The Democratic-Republicans, led by Thomas
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Jefferson and James Madison, argued that individual liberty
was best preserved in the widest possible diffusion of
authority, and that a strong central government would soon
pervert its broad powers into tyranny. Alexander Hamilton
and his Federalist party distrusted democracy's ability to
protect the public interest, and argued that a strong central
government was vital to ensuring the security and the growth
of the new nation [90] . This conflict between opposing
philosophies was played out in numerous specific Constitutional
issues, and continued to be the main source of factionalism
long after the Constitution was ratified.
That the adherents of two such diametrically opposed doc-
trines could propose to come together to create a government
that would be acceptable to both factions is a testimonial,
in itself, to their faith in the ability of rational men to
achieve compromise. The framers of the Constitution resolved
the Hobbes-Locke dilemma of order versus freedom by creating
a new and special form of government - the democratic republic.
Locke's democratic ideals were represented in the right of
the people to elect those who would govern. Yet the public
interest would be protected from mob democracy by the exercise
of sovereignty by those elected representatives. In the design
of the new central government, adequate power was granted to
protect the public interest, but that power was carefully
divided and balanced so that liberty could never be destroyed
by tyranny.
90
The federalist structure designed by the founding fathers
was based upon a precisely calculated system of checks and
balances, on the vertical as well as the horizontal plane.
The vertical balance of power was ensured by reserving for
the states all powers not specifically enumerated for the
central government in the Constitution. On the horizontal
plane, authority was balanced among the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of government. This compromise
did not eliminate the basic philosophic differences between
Jefferson's Republicans and Hamilton's Federalists, nor did
it resolve the problem of factions . What it did do was
solve the immediate problem of devising a structure for the
new central government which could gain the ratification of
the states. This preference for solving immediate practical
problems in favor of attempting to resolve more difficult
and more abstract long-terms issues would continue to be
reflected in the American national character, and would
prove to be both a strength and a weakness in America's
ability to pursue the national interest in relations with
other nations.
One of the major concerns of both parties as they at-
tempted to work out the structure of American government
was the prevention of the arbitrary exercise of political
power by any one faction. The destructiveness of uncontrolled
factionalism was seen as one of the greatest threats to the
security of the new nation. James Madison, in Federalist 10 ,
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addressed this problem, and, in so doing, described a model of
democratic government that has been a major characteristic
of both the political system and the national character of
the United States.
"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well con-
structed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed
than its tendency to break and control the violence of
faction," [91] Madison wrote. He stated that there are two
methods for curing the mischief of factionalism - removing
the cause and controlling the effects. Removing the cause
can be accomplished in two ways. The first is to destroy
the liberty which is essential to the existence of factions;
this remedy, Madison dismissed as worse than the disease.
The second is to give every citizen, "the same opinions,
the same passions, and the same interests" [92]. Since this
course is possible only in a Utopia, the solution must lie
in controlling the effects.
Madison addressed the problem of controlling the effects
of factionalism in two cases. In the first, a minority fac-
tion, he saw no great danger, since majority rule would
prevent a minority faction from endangering the public
interest. The critical problem, in his view, arose when
the majority is included in a faction; through majority rule,
such a faction could sacrifice the public interest to its
own particular interest. In framing this issue, Madison
stated what he considered to be the central problem of
democratic government:
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"To secure the public good, and private rights, against
the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government,
is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add, that it is the great desideratum,
by which alone this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored,
and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind." [9 3]
Madison's answer to this "great object" was based upon
the existence of the many factions which would develop in
a large republic. As the nation grew in size, so too would
the number of individual factions competing for political
influence. No one faction could ever become totally dominant
and thus attain the ability to trample the rights of the
minority, or subvert the public interest to its own ends.
The necessity to attain a consensus of differing factions
in order to constitute a majority was, in Madison's view,
the greatest protection against the danger of majority
faction. Since that consensus would change from issue to
issue, the public interest would consistently be preserved.
Despite the logic of Madison's argument, the problems of
factionalism continued to plague the new republic. George
Washington, in his Farewell Address, felt compelled to warn
his countrymen against "the baneful effects of the spirit of
party generally." To Washington, partisanship was "a fire
not to be quenched. It demands a uniform vigilence to pre-
vent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming,
it should consume." [94]
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Majority rule on the basis of democratic consensus has
been the essence of the American style of government. James
Madison's concept of consensus-building among a host of
diverse factions still represents an accurate model of the
political process by which the public interest is determined
and the majority of public policy is made. No policy can
be sustained in the absence of the legitimacy that is engen-
dered by the presence of consensus. Any concept of the
public or national interest must recognize the role and the
importance of democratic consensus, from the era of Federalist
10 to this comment from an aide to President Carter:
"Because of what has happened to the political parties
over the years, and to the special interest groups, and
the resulting fragmentation, it is now more true than
ever that the President can get things done only when
he can develop the public consensus for action, and when
he cannot, he will fail." [95]
C. THE FRONTIER EXPERIENCE
This chapter concerning the national character began
with the statement that it has been the product of ideas
interacting with experience. In the previous two sections,
the role of philosophic and political ideas has been
emphasized. In this section, the importance of experience
will be addressed. The experience which has been the single
most dominant influence in shaping the national character is
embodied in the concept of the American frontier.
For roughly three centuries, from the founding of
Jamestown in 1607 until approximately 1890, the chief concern
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of American life was the settling of the frontier. This
process proceeded with unbroken continuity while Americans
fought for independence, while they devised the structure
of government for the new republic, and even while they
engaged one another in bloody civil war [96] . There was
always new territory to settle; before one acquisition was
fully settled, more land was obtained. This inexorable
expansion came to be seen as the manifest destiny of the
nation; one of the most articulate advocates of this doctrine,
John L. 0' Sullivan, editor of the Democratic Review , wrote
of "the inevitable fulfillment of the general law which is
rolling our population westward." He continued "(it) is
too evident to leave us in doubt of the manifest design of
Providence in regard to the occupation of this continent." [97]
What the frontier represented was a vast body of wealth
without proprietors. (The native Indians were never con-
sidered to have established rights of ownership over the
territories which they inhabited.) It was an environment of
abundance without end, abundance that was freely available
for the taking, with none of the restraints and restrictions
of the Old World. Historian Thomas Carlyle once said to an
American,
"Ye may boast o' yer dimocracy, or any ither 'cracy, or
any kind o' poleetical roobish; but the reason why yer
laboring folk are so happy is thot ye have a vost deal
o 1 land for a verra few people." [98]
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All that was required to partake of this vast wealth was
initiative and hard work. The spirit of American enter-
prise was born of and nurtured by the frontier.
The effects of the frontier experience were felt every-
where, and impressed themselves indelibly upon the American
character. Characteristic of the young Republic of the
nineteenth century, that was busy looking outward rather than
inward, it was visitors from abroad who were most sensitive
to the importance of the Western frontier in shaping the
character of the nation. Lord Bryce, who toured the West in
1881 and again in 1883, wrote,
"The West is the most American part of America; that is
to say, the part where those features which distinguish
America from Europe came out in the strongest relief.
What Europe is to Asia, what England is to the rest of
Europe, what America is to England, that the Western
States and Territories are to the Atlantic States." [99]
An earlier English traveller, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke,
was one of the first observers of the frontier experience
to relate the character of the land itself to the character
of its inhabitants. He noted, "The singular wideness of
Western thought, always verging on extravagance, is tracable
to the width of Western land." He concluded, "When you have
once set eyes upon the never-ending sweep of the Great Plains,
you no longer wonder that America rejects
Malthusianism. " [100J
The traits that struck these visitors as characteristic
of the inhabitants of the American frontier included dis-
regard for convention, unbridled optimism, boisterous
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politics, mobility of population, self-taught ingenuity -
these became the stereotype of the nation. The values which
brought success on the frontier became the values cherished
by the country. Above all, the frontier experience com-
plemented and strengthened the concept of individualism
inherited from the philsophers of the Enlightenment. The
ideal of Jeffersonian democracy could not have been envis-
ioned without the existential reality of the frontier to
give it substance.
The individualism fostered by the frontier experience
emphasized certain character traits. Foremost among these
was the belief in the efficacy and value of individual hard
work, and the confidence that such labor would be rewarded.
Concern with practical necessities rather than abstract
concepts, and an admiration of success for its own sake be-
came ingrained in the American work ethic. The man of the
American frontier was forced to be self-reliant, so this
attribute became a national goal. The frontier fostered
a simple concept of justice, with reward and punishment being
o
meted out on the basis of individual merit.
During America's three centuries of living the frontier
experience, the meaning and the significance of this ever
westward expansion was largely left to such foreign observers
as the two cited. Americans were too busy with the practical
tasks of settling the frontier to devote time and effort to
national introspection. Those who were not moving themselves
97
to settle new lands, such as newspaper editor Horace Greeley,
were occupied in urging others to "Go West!" and in lobbying
Congress to provide free land to all who took that
advice [101]
.
It was a (then) little known college professor who began
the American formulation of a hypothesis concerning the
impact of the westward movement, and its significance in
forming America's national character. This task of explana-
tion after-the-fact was begun in 1893, when Frederick Jackson
Turner read his paper titled "The Significance of the
Frontier in American History" to the annual meeting of the
American Historical Association [102] . Opening with a state-
ment from the Superintendent of the Census that the year
1890 marked the official end of the fronter line as an
element in the census reports, Turner's paper continued:
"This brief official statement marks the closing of a
great historic movement. Up to our own day American
history has been in a large degree the history of the
colonization of the Great West. The existence of an
area of free land, its continuous recession, and the
advance of American settlement westward, explain
American development.
Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and
modifications, lie the vital forces that call these
organs into life and shape them to meet changing
conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions
is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt
themselves to the changes of an expanding people . .
.
From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual
traits of profound importance . . . The result is that
to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking
characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined
with acuteness and inquisitiveness ; that practical,
inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that
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masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artis-
tic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless,
nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working
for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and
exuberance which comes with freedom - these are traits
of the frontier..." [103]
Turner's thesis about the American frontier touched off a
new era in American historiography. His perceptions of the
critical influence of the Frontier experience created both
controversy and a wave of interest in the study of the West.
His conclusions have been examined and refined by historians
for nearly a century, but none have disputed his basic thesis
that the frontier was the critical experience which shaped
our national character.
At the same time that Turner was explaining the import-
ance of the frontier experience, another group of scholars
began a re-examination of philosophy from the American
perspective. These scholars, through philosophic analysis,
were attempting to fit traditional ideas to the American
experience. In this effort, they would develop a uniquely
American philosophy that both reflected the national charac-
ter, and provided it with an explicit intellectual foundation
D. THE CONTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM
Ideas and experience are most clearly synthesized in
the philosophy of American Pragmatism. Built upon the
theoretical analyses of Charles Sanders Pierce and Chauncy
Wright, this philosophy was clarified and given explicit
behavioral applications in the works of William James. John
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Dewey reformulated the major ideas of Pragmatism, trans-
forming the individualistic orientation of James into an
orientation of concrete social and political action [104]
.
Pragmatism combined both theoretical and practical responses
to the conditions of American society at the end of the last
century and beginning of this one, and to advances in the
physical sciences, especially modern physics.
Two clear and distinct problems of intellectual life
provided the impetus which led to the development of
9 ....Pragmatism. The first was an increasing suspicion that
the completely rational, knowable universe of Isaac Newton
did not actually reflect the real universe. The Newtonian
rational paradigm had produced a vast body of philosophic
systems of absolute natural laws which regulated the universe
Under the illumination of Albert Einstein's Laws of Rel-
ativity and Werner Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy,
conviction in the validity of absolutes was severely shaken.
Relativism and indeterminacy in philosophy, as well as the
physical sciences, began to produce a subtle modification
in the climate of opinion, the basic epistomological frame-
work of all philosophic analysis.
Moreover, the natural law interpretations of man in
society seemed inadequate to explain the social conditions
that actually existed. The late 19th century was an age of
burgeoning industrialization, urbanization, rapid techno-
logical advances, and increasing societal and individual
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interdependence. Rather than an increasing number of people
achieving happiness, as had been promised by Bentham and John
Stewart Mill, an increasing number were finding only poverty
and misery. Clearly, something with greater promise than
the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer was needed, if this
trend were to be reversed.
The second impetus for Pragmatism was the schism in
European philosophy which had followed the Hegelian system
of thought. Proceeding from Hegel's principle of the dia-
lectic, and his conceptualization of Spirit as the motive
force of history, philosophers had divided over the question
"What is essential in the universe - spirit or matter?" The
mind-body dualism, in which absolute idealism and absolute
materialism were viewed as mutually exclusive choices, be-
came the dominant issue of philosophic examination. Hegelian
idealism was being taught at most American universities, [105]
but it was being increasingly challenged by such materialistic
doctrines as Marxism, The either-or choice demanded by the
European dualism seemed inadequate to the American intellec-
tuals who would invent Pragmatism, as a result of their
attempts to fashion a system of thought that could accom-
modate both idealism and materialism.
American Pragmatism answered both of the needs described
above. It resolved the schism between idealists and
materialists, as well as providing a synthesis of the
Newtonian paradigm and the relativism that was emerging from
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modern physics. Pragmatists postulated that in a universe
of such unfathomable vastness as ours, it is conceivable,
and therefore logical, that spirit and matter coexist in
some fashion beyond the understanding of human intelligence.
We do not know and cannot ever know with certainty what is
Truth. All that we can know is that which is revealed by
the human senses and by the study of human history. What
these sources tell us is that both ideal and material factors
have influenced human behavior and shaped history; therefore,
both of these factors are reflections of reality.
William James called the basis of this new philosophy
"radical empiricism" [106] . Describing this epistomology
,
James argued that any observable effect, whatever its cause,
must be admitted as evidence; in his words,
"To be radical an empiricism must neither admit into its
construction any element that is not directly experienced,
nor exclude from them any element that is directly
experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that
connect experiences must themselves be experienced rela-
tions, and any kind of relation experienced must be
accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system." [107J
James's radical empiricism revealed that pluralism was
the state of the actual world, and thus, pluralism in ideas
was the philosophy which most accurately reflected that world.
Rather than denying either material or idealistic reality,
James conceptualized a universe that is conjunctive and
multi-dimensional. The existential reality of indeterminacy
demands that philosophy must be able to accommodate spirit
and matter, absolutes and relativism, simultaneously. While
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absolute truth is beyond man's ability to prove, it is also
beyond his ability to prove that absolutes do not exist, and
it can be demonstrated that belief in idealistic absolutes
is an important factor of human behavior.
The test of validity of an idea, according to Pragmatism,
is workability. Substituting flexibility for the rigidity of
traditional philosophic systems of thought, Pragmatism de-
fines truth as the beliefs which prove useful by providing
the believer with accurate expectations about the world.
Truth can never be final, because experience can always
change one's perceptions about the world, but for the present,
a true idea is any idea which helps the individual achieve a
satisfactory understanding of his life and his environment.
The fixed propositions of classical rationalism, expressed in
terms of natural laws, will eventually fail this test of work-
ability, and are therefore disuseful. Indeed, it was the
recognition of the failure of natural law interpretations to
explain the conditions of American society which initiated
the developments which led to Pragmatism.
James stressed the importance of the human will in deter-
mining what is true (in accordance with the above test) . By
an act of will, an individual can give reality to an abstract
idea, including an absolute ideal, such as the omnipotence of
God, which may not be real for some other individual. This
aspect of Pragmatism made an important contribution to the
national character; ideals in public policy, by an act of
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national will, achieve reality. Idealism is not necessarily
negated by the facts of realpolitik . Although James never
addressed the will to believe in the context of public policy,
it was his philosophic analysis which provided the rational
explanation and resolution of the apparent dualism of the
American character - the coexistence of idealism and realism,
without producing irreconcilable conflict. More than three
centuries after Hobbes stated the dilemma of individual
versus public interests, the philosophy of American Pragmatism
offered the first intellectually consistent means of
resolution.
Relative to the concept of the public interest, James's
important contribution was the demonstration that, by a philo-
sophic system of Pragmatism, the validity and the meaning of
the concept is not negated by indeterminacy. Values in which
people have the will to believe are real determinants of the
public interest, and cannot be discarded on the basis of
indeterminism. His emphasis on practical utility as the
test of validity provided a philosophic foundation for the
existential political system which had developed in response
to the requirements of the frontier experience.
The implications of Pragmatism for political action were
made explicit in the works of John Dewey, particularly The
Public and Its Problems . Dewey was concerned with all aspects
of human knowledge and behavior; this discussion will focus
on his importance as a political theorist, and his
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contribution to the concept of the public interest as an
element of the national character.
In The Public and Its Problems , Dewey concentrated on
what he called "the eclipse of the public" [108] . This is
the inability of the public, or the community as a whole, to
protect itself against the depredations of private interests.
He asserted that the American political system had accom-
modated itself, only in piecemeal fashion and with great lag,
to the industrial transformation of the country. The public
had been replaced by various factions, among which no con-
sensus could be formed which represented the true public
interest.
Dewey saw the solution to this problem in the development
of an articulate public which had an awareness of genuine
common interests. His great attention to the importance of
education stemmed from his belief in the need to develop such
a public. His Pragmatist orientation led him to stress the
application of the methods of the social sciences to the
problems of politics and social action. The public interest
was identified with the solution of concrete problems and the
satisfaction of concrete human needs.
The importance of American Pragmatism, both for the con-
cept of the public interest and in the shaping of the national
character, lay not so much in any immediate substantive
changes to the political system, but rather as "the intellec-
tual rationalization for the reshaping of American
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institutions that has taken place slowly over the twentieth
century" [109] . Pragmatism gave intellectual expression to
what Turner had described as "the traits of the frontier."
The test of workability, and the emphasis upon empirical
knowledge have been adapted to public policy-making and
political institutions. The ability to experiment, to try
radical political and economic innovations, which has allowed
a political system devised in the eighteenth century to meet
the requirements of the twentieth, is American Pragmatism in
operation. That throughout this process of staggering in-
novations, certain "self-evident truths" have retained their
power to motivate the nation's citizens in an impressive
testimonial to what James called "the will to believe."
E. THE MODERN DILEMMA - THE SEARCH FOR A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
This century, and particularly the last two decades, has
witnessed an increasingly deepening national identity crisis
in America. What is America really about? What do we stand
for in the world? As recently as 1960, these questions
elicited clear and self-confident answers which reflected
the strong national belief in the inherent validity of com-
monly shared values. Today the answers are neither clear,
nor are they capable of inspiring a broad consensus. When
the words of a popular song can define freedom as "just
another word for nothing left to lose," [110] there has





Walter Lippman described this national identity crisis
as "an historic catastrophe," consisting of "the steep and
sudden decline of the power and influence and self-confidence
of the Western democracies" {111]. Echoing John Dewey's
thesis of the eclipse of the public, Lippman stated that the
public philosophy had been eclipsed by "the plurality of in-
compatible faiths" [112] . He traced this eclipse to the fact
that Americans had become alienated from the inner principles
of their national institutions. Widespread belief in these
principles comprised the public philosophy which had supported
the phenomenal rise of American democracy. According to
Lippman, loss of belief occurred when these fundamental tenets
of the American creed were removed from the public domain,
and became instead a matter of private subjective relevance
for each individual. The result has been the inability of
democratic government to define clearly, or to make policy
which supports, the genuine public interest.
Lippman wrote this eloquent indictment of the pernicious
effects of public opinion, when the public is without the
rudder of a public philosophy;
"The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion
has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures.
The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of
informed and responsible officials. They have compelled
the governments, which usually knew what would have been
wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be
too late with too little, or too long with too much,
too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too
neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent.
Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century.
It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions
when the stakes are life and death." [113]
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Lippman's analysis of the malaise which infects America
in the twentieth century appears to attack the fundamental
tenets of American Pragmatism. The coexistence of indeter-
minacy and self-evident truths founded upon moral values was
too complex to inspire a public philosophy that could be
widely shared. In reality, it has not been the acceptance of
Pragmatism which led to the national identity crisis, but
rather the public failure to understand fully what Pragmatism
implied. The complexity of a pluralist epistomology precluded
widespread understanding or acceptance. What people extracted
from Pragmatism was that the rational paradigm of Newton had
been discredited; they failed to grasp that pluralism offered
an approach which squared rationalism with relativity. The
result has been an increasing resignation to the acceptance
of irrational man, marching along what Gunter Remmling called
the "road to suspicion" [114J
.
No single historic event can be identified as the sole or
even the primary cause of the shattering of the public
philosophy. The progressive movement which began in the last
century was an early manifestation of awareness of a gap be-
tween what people believed and what existed as social reality.
Writers such as Herbert Croley began in the first decade of
this century to describe a vague public malaise, a general
dissatisfaction with the utility of the national public
philosophy [115]. For too many people, the American Dream
seemed to contain elements of nightmare; the ideals of
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Jeffersonian democracy seemed to have little relevance for
the developing mass society.
The shock of the First World War, for which democracy
had been ill-prepared, accentuated the decline of America's
public philosophy. The rise of totalitarianism in Europe,
hard on the heels of the "war to make the world safe for
democracy" further weakened public confidence in the efficacy
of democratic institutions. A second global war, more ter-
rible than the first and only one generation removed from
the war to end all wars, all but destroyed what remained of
America's public philosophy. When that war ended, not with
greater security for the nation, but with the birth of the
nuclear age, in which it soon became clear that the country
faced the greatest insecurity it had ever known, what Lippman
called an historic catastrophe was complete. In an interna-
tional system based upon a balance of terror, the most basic
interest - self-preservation - is in constant jeopardy. The
rational epistomology of the Newtonian universe seems less
relevant to these conditions than the irrational, unknowable
metaphysic of the medieval age.
Events in the domestic sector, as well as the realities
of international politics, contributed to the assault upon
the traditional public philosophy. David Broder described
the next generation of political leaders in these grim words:
"Having come of age in the traumatic decade bracketed by
the murder of one President and the forced resignation
of another, they have lost whatever romantic idealism
they may have held about politics and government." [116]
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A political aide to Edward Kennedy told Broder, "I don't
think our generation has produced a vision of the future. I
don't think there's a consensus on it. I don't think it's
been articulated." [117]
The scion of a great political family, William
Scranton III, described the breakdown of the public philosophy
in these words;
"... in the turmoil of the sixties, when my political
awareness began to form, there was a time when the
political iceberg of America began to break up. It was
more than just Vietnam. It was an emergence of a dif-
ferent way of looking at the world - naive in some res-
pects, helpful in some, and in some ... even corrupt.
But it was an emergence of a new worldview." [118]
British journalist Godfrey Hodgson, in the tradition of
earlier British observers of the American scene, was perhaps
closer to the truth when he noted, "At the heart of the
political rebellion there was a deep feeling that something
was wrong not just with political leaders or with their
policies, but with American society itself" [119]. T. H.
White, in analyzing the 1976 Presidential campaign found that
this search for the meaning of America was the dominant theme
of the campaign; he wrote, "The country was concerned with
basic questions, with what holds the nation together, not
with issues" [120]
.
During his troubled Presidency, Jimmy Carter continued to
seek a remedy for the malaise that troubled his country.
"Perhaps no President since Lincoln," commented White, "has
probed so deeply into the metaphysics of spirit that makes
110
America a nation as Jimmy Carter tried to do" [121] . Despite
Carter's efforts to reinfuse the nation with his vision of
moral leadership, polls conducted by Candidate Ronald Reagan's
organization in 1980 found that
"From 1973 to 1980 fewer than 20 per cent of the country
felt that the nation was on the 'right track.' Seventy-,
five out of every hundred Americans thought that the
country was misdirected and in disarray." [122]
This lack of public confidence was in stark contrast to the
survey work done by Cantril in the 1950' s - "The American
pattern, Cantril discovered ... was the most distinctive of
all. Americans were the most confident people in the
world." [123]
As each generation has come of age in this century, from
Croley to Lippman to contemporaries, such as White and Broder,
they have found an increasingly serious crisis of confidence
in the American public. The lack of a public philosophy on
which to base beliefs about the national interest assumes
added importance when that lack is juxtaposed with the dom-
inant fact of international relations - the Soviet-American
rivalry. Willing or not, America is engaged in a contest
with the Soviet Union and the socialist philosophy which
that country represents. That contest is for the allegiance
and the faith of millions of people. Our adversary in this
contest is not hampered by a similar lack of an articulated
public philosophy; Marxism-Leninism claims not only to explain
everything, but to explain it on a scientific basis. When
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America can offer no comparable cohesive public philosophy
which supports our democratic ideals, our invitation to join
the free world appears to be not much better than an invita-
tion to anarchy.
What to believe, and even more important, how we know
what to believe, have become the predominant questions of
psychology, philosophy, and the social sciences in the
twentieth century. If as Lippman asserted, the restoration
of an effective democratic government requires the revival
of an accepted public philosophy, how is that philosophy to
be shaped? How is the public interest to be discerned, and
who will discern it? If the Jeffersonian concepts of rational
and just citizens and the Madisonian model of democratic con-
sensus have become irrelevant for the age of the mass society,
what should be put in their places? These questions consti-
tute the central problem facing America's strategic planners,
who are charged with preserving and enhancing the national
character.
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VI. A VALUE-CENTERED APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST
In a recent study which attempts to forecast the kinds of
challenges which will confront the United States in the coming
decade, William J. Taylor noted that "increasingly, the
national security establishment is trying to come to grips
with the necessity to gain insights into the future as a
partial basis for making decisions" [124] . The realization
of this necessity has resulted in greater attention being
given to strategic planning by both military and civilian
decision-makers. Unfortunately, this increased attention has
failed to produce a substantive framework of analysis within
which long-range planning can be carried out effectively.
Current approaches to strategic planning fall into one of
two patterns. Either they begin and end with a resource
limitation orientation, treating planning as nothing more
than a decision-making process for the distribution of scarce
resources, or they skip directly to what should be considered
last in the planning process, procedures and techniques. In
order to overcome the shortcomings of these two common
approaches, it is necessary to break with the prevailing in-
tellectual tradition in national security studies which dis-
counts the importance, or even the reality, of values. Only
a value-centered approach to the problem of defining the
national interest, which integrates the ideals and moral
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values of the American Dream with the more obviously tangible
and easily measured factors of international politics, is
capable of yielding a concept which has utility for strategic
planning.
This concluding chapter will first examine what functions
the concept of the national interest must serve in the context
of strategic planning, and then suggest an approach to defin-
ing that interest which can meet those requirements. This
suggested approach is in no sense intended to provide a final
substantive resolution to the problem of the national interest;
rather, it constitutes a conceptual approach which promises a
more cohesive articulation of the national interest than the
ad hoc responses to challenges and opportunities which have
predominated during the past several decades.
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
In assessing what strategic planners require from the
concept of the national interest, it is helpful to consider
how long-range planning differs from policy-making. The
principal difference is the degree of uncertainty which
characterizes the respective environments. For the most
part, policy-making is concerned with specific problematic
situations; although some uncertainties are always present,
many factors can be identified which contribute to the defini-
tion of the national interest for a given problematic
situation. Such elements as the degree of consensus about
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the situation, the level of essentiality of the interests
concerned, and the content and effectiveness of past policy
which relates to the situation are all matters that can be
determined and can serve as guides to the national interest.
The strategic planner, on the other hand, has no such
guides to reduce uncertainty. Rather than dealing with
present problematic situations, his environment is the future,
dominated by uncertainty. The more distant the planning
horizon, the greater is the uncertainty which masks that
horizon. Of the many variables which the planner must weigh,
only two can be considered to have any degree of long-term
stability. These are the national character, which was
described in the previous chapter, and the long-range national
goals which derive from this character and perceived national
needs. Because there are so few stable indicators available
to the strategic planner, these two assume a far greater
importance for planning than they do for short-term policy
decision-making
.
The centrality of goals has been recognized in numerous
studies of the strategic planning process. John Collins
listed "goal oriented guidance" as one of the essential pre-
conditions for effective defense planning, and one of the
most critical weaknesses of actual U. S. defense
planning" [125]. A strategic planning experiment conducted
by the United States Navy in 1979 emphasized the importance
of objectives, in terms of statements of ends and means,
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throughout the study [126J . One of the most eloquent state-
ments concerning what happens when goals are neglected was
written by Walter Lippman in 1960:
"The critical weakness of our society is that for the
time being our people do not have great purposes which
they are united in wanting to achieve. The public mood
of the country is defensive, to hold on and to conserve,
not to push forward and create. We talk about ourselves
these days as if we were a completed society, one which
has achieved its purposes, and has no further great
business to transact ..." 1127]
Goals fulfill a number of inter-related functions in the
political process, as well as for strategic planning. First,
they provide direction which makes possible the mobilization
of the public energy and efforts toward a common end. With-
out such a mobilization, the national will to achieve great
ends is lacking. The second function of goals is a coordinat-
ing role. Only with a clear sense of direction and objectives
can there be effective coordination of activities. As national
tasks become more complex, and broader in scope, the import-
ance of this coordinating function increases. Third, the
articulation of goals, especially when those goals encompass
a noble purpose, calls forth a sense of public commitment,
which derives from the knowledge that the goals are shared by
other members of the polity. Fourth, the acceptance of goals
legitimates public authority. Sacrifices required to achieve
the goals are accepted by the public as legitimate demands
by the government. Finally, goals serve as the ultimate
source of evaluation of the national effort; without
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recognized objectives, it is impossible to measure progress
toward desired ends,
It is as the foundation for the development of national
goals that the concept of the national interest is most crit-
ical to strategic planning. Goals cannot be formulated in
a vacuum; some statement of the nation's ultimate purpose
and aims is required as a base. The national interest serves
as the overarching criterion which links diverse and sometimes
conflicting goals into a cohesive pattern.
In addition to this primary function of the national
interest as the foundation upon which goals are based, the
concept must fulfill two other functions for strategic
planning. First, it is the mechanism by which national activ-
ities in foreign affairs are given legitimacy. Just as goals
legitimate authority, a clear articulation of the national
interest and how a particular strategy supports that interest
gives the strategy legitimacy. Without some concept of the
national interest, there is no rationale to show why the
nation should pursue one course of action rather than another.
The national interest provides this rationale which explains
to the public why the United States selects a particular
foreign policy strategy.
The final function which the concept of the national in-
terest must serve in the context of strategic planning con-
cerns consensus. The national interest provides the basic
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central position around which consensus for specific policies
can be built. Even more so than in the era when George
Washington decried the deleterious effects of faction, con-
sensus is essential to effective political action. The
national interest is the broad statement of the primary aims
and hopes of the public; some degree of consensus about these
aims and hopes is a critical pre-requisite for effective
strategic planning. Because of the lack of a clear articula-
tion of the national interest, this consensus has been absent
in recent decades.
Both legitimacy and consensus contribute to the strength-
ening of normative, or democratic, compliance. This highest
level of compliance is an essential element of the national
will, which serves to enhance both the effectiveness of
policy and the magnitude of national power. Conversely, the
absence of this compliance acts to weaken the national will
and reduce national power. It is in this context of legit-
imacy, consensus and democratic compliance that the strategic
planner must consider the nature of the national character as
the critical determinant of the national interest. Because
that character encompasses certain ideals and moral values,
as well as a uniquely American concern with practicality, the
concept of the national interest adopted by strategic plan-
ners must reflect both aspects of this dualistic character.
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B. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN DREAM
If we accept the above analysis as a framework, that the
concept of the national interest must serve strategic planners
by providing the foundation for goals development, establish-
ing legitimacy, and eliciting consensus, it is clear that no
concept can succeed in meeting these requirements unless it
is compatible with the American Dream. Assuredly, the most
difficult aspect of the Dream to incorporate into the national
interest is that part composed of ideals and moral values, but
the attempt must be made. The Presidential Commission on
National Goals, which published its report, "Prospects for
America," in 1961, concluded that, in a world of considerable
change, "What do remain fixed are American ideals and
values" [128J .
Paradoxically, while these values and ideals do exhibit
significant stability, they also must be able to accommodate
change over the long-term. This paradox, the necessity to
articulate values that have enduring stability, yet contribute
to the gradual evolution of the society in the desired direc-
tion, has been one of the major problems which has confronted
normative conceptions of the public interest. Despite this
difficulty, it is these values and ideals which constitute
the only viable basis for long-term goals, legitimize govern-
ment activities, and inspire some degree of public consensus.
Thus, the national interest must affirm the relevance of
national strategy to these values; to do this, the national
interest must be framed in the context of the American Dream.
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Before attempting to frame a concept of the national in-
terest, then, it is essential to consider how the American
Dream has shaped the national purpose. In the words of one
historian, "The cliches and platitudes expounded in versions
of the American Dream are no less real because they lack
exactitude in definition or application" [129] . To some
extent, the very diversity of the Dream, and the imprecision
of its precepts has been one of its enduring strengths.
The American Dream grew out of the perception of universal
values shared by the early colonists, was proclaimed by the.
Founding Fathers, and has been subsequently elaborated by
successive generations of Americans in response to historical
experience. The early colonial version of the Dream focused
on the rejection of such anachronisms as elitism in government,
class distinction by birth, the suppression of humanistic
ideals, and the denial of individual mobility [13 0J . In the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson added a new ele-
ment to the Dream, the cause of political freedom for the
human race. This 18th century generation of revolutionaries
saw their actions as a watershed in human history, and them-
selves as agents of what John Adams called "a grand scheme
and design in Providence for the illumination and emancipa-
tion of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth" [131].
By the end of the 19th century, the American Dream en-
compassed a number of great causes, which Americans believed
they represented, and were eager to spread throughout the
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world. These causes included such ideals as democracy,
individual liberty, pluralism, and a sense of morality in
both individual and national behavior. In our own century,
the Dream has been broadened step by step, to envision an
ever-expanding definition of freedom for greater and greater
numbers of people. From the concept that men have the in-
alienable right to enjoy political freedom in order to seek
happiness, the Dream has grown to include the concept that
men (and women) have the inalienable right to pursue self-
actualization as the road to happiness.
As the promise of the Dream expanded, so too did its
diversity and flexibility. In the twentieth century,
"It has been a composite of similar, different, and even
contradictory expressions of aspirations and ambitions
that have been reflected in the dichotomous approach to
war and peace, to isolationism and interventionism, to
tolerance or truth, to principle or expediency, and to
the acceptance or rejection of responsibility for one's
actions." [132]
This pluralistic nature of the American Dream has not diluted
its power; its complexity offers the opportunity to accept or
reject those elements of the Dream most compatible with
individual and national aspirations.
Nor has its power as a motivation been diluted because it
has never tallied exactly with reality, even for Americans
themselves. What gave the American Dream its power was the
confident belief that it represented an attainable goal. If
its ideals and values were illusion, the illusion was real
enough to inspire dedication and conviction, real enough that
men were willing to fight and die for its preservation.
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The critical importance of the American Dream to the
nation's sense of purpose was captured by novelist William
Faulkner. Attempting to explain the national aimlessness
that seemed to inflict America, he wrote,
"What happened to the American Dream? We dozed, and it
abandoned us . And in that vacuum now there sound no
longer the strong loud voices . . . speaking in mutual
unification of one hope and will." [133]
Whether the Dream abandoned us, as Faulkner seems to suggest,
or we abandoned the Dream, it is within our power to reaffirm
America's commitment to the ideals of the Dream as the basis
of the national interest.
Such a reaffirmation is not easy in the modern American
climate of opinion, dominated by relativism. Any form of
moral absolutism seems out of place in our age, as does
belief in any value which cannot be validated empirically.
What is required is a conscious and deliberate decision to
turn away from what a not quite respectable modern philosopher
has termed "the cult of moral grayness" [134]. It requires
the intellectual courage to believe in fundamental values
and ideals which are beyond empirical verification in an
empirical age. The philosophic justification for making this
secular leap of faith is to be found in the premises of
American Pragmatism.
C. A PRAGMATIST'S CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The fundamental metaphysical presupposition of Pragmatism
is that the universe and everything in it is characterized by
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pluralism. A pluralist epistomology begins with the admis-
sion of the limitation of man's ability to achieve knowledge
of ultimate truth. It recognizes that empirical verification
is useful for material problems, and that intuitive methods
may be necessary for other types of questions. Pluralism
allows for a combination of the two methods of knowledge in
situations where that may be necessary and proper. The con-
cept of the national interest appears to fit this category of
problems which demand both empiricism and intuition.
William James demonstrated that the will to believe gives
reality to abstract ideals and beliefs which are beyond empir-
ical verification. What has been missing from recent attempts
in political science to devise an operational concept of the
national interest has been the will to believe that the funda-
mental beliefs of the American Dream comprise real motivations
for national behavior, with the power to shape public support
for national policy. A concept of the national interest that
will have utility in the context of goals, legitimacy, and
consensus must, as a first step, reintegrate the normative
components of American democratic theory with the empirical
approach to political issues which has dominated both the
theory and practice of national security affairs during the
past several decades.
This conclusion may appear to present an impasse, since
the question - "What is the national interest?" - has not
been answered. No list of public values has been generated;
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no specific formula has been offered to strategic planners
which can be used to determine the national interest. Such a
task is beyond the ability of general or mid-range theory to
perform, because it requires that the question "national
interest relative to what, or concerned with what?" be
addressed. What this conceptual approach does provide is the
explicit acknowledgement that the national interest cannot be
defined by purely empirical methods; it is a cognitive con-
cept which requires faith as well as the ability to perceive
reality accurately. The first-level component of a Pragmatic
concept of the national interest is the awareness that moral
values and ideals are important to the American public, and
any statement of the national interest which fails to take
account of these values and ideals will fail.
There has been a great deal of criticism in recent times
of attempts to define the national interest from a value-
centered approach. For example, Dean Acheson, one of the most
brilliant Secretaries of State, wrote, "... moral teachings
and moral doctrines can be of little guidance, if any, in
assessing the substance of international problems" 1135]. It
is true that morality divorced from political reality may
lead to ineffective or even counter-productive policies.
However, a reality which does not admit of morality is in-
compatible with the most basic tenets of American democracy.
Concepts of the national interest which discount moral values
as irrelevant fail because they do not comprehend the neces-
sity for moral leadership in a democracy.
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As an illustration, Elliot Richardson stands out as one
of the few political actors in the last decade to have under-
stood fully the power of moral leadership, and the American
response to it. His insistence on resigning his office (as
Attorney General) rather than commit an immoral act made him
the only major Nixon Administration figure to emerge from the
Watergate scandal with his reputation intact. His attitude
was epitomized by this statement to his staff, during a dis-
cussion of a particular thorny political problem: "I think
the first thing we are going to do is start with the proposi-
tion that we will do what is right" [136] . This belief that
it is possible to perceive the morally right solution, and
the commitment to act in accordance with that perception, is
the essence of moral leadership, and it is that kind of
leadership which is demanded by the American people.
Much of the opposition to including any normative compo-
nent in a theory of the national interest centers on the
legitimate fear that such a course will lead to moral excess.
There are ample historical examples to justify this fear,
including, in our own history, Wilsonian idealism, when the
very concept of a national interest was subordinated to the
advancement of moral values. Additionally, there is the fear
that by affirming certain ideals and values as central to
the national interest, one risks excluding other values,
which may be equally precious to segments of the population.
Several periods of active persecution of the American
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Communist Party, as well as other minorities, give validity
to this argument. Finally, overshadowing these concerns,
stands the philosophic primacy of relativism in our age. The
epistomological presuppositions which are necessary to support
any kind of normative belief have been effectively demolished
by the triumph of pure empiricism.
The escape from these dilemmas lies in the very pluralism
of America which makes it difficult to articulate the national
interest. As historian Ralph Henry Gabriel noted in his study
of American intellectual development,
"The American democratic faith is a system of checks and
balances in the realm of ideas. It asserts the possibility
of a balance between liberty and authority, between the
self-expression of the free individual and the necessary
coercion of the organized group. The democratic faith is,
then, in essence, a philosophy of the mean." [137]
It has been through the commitment to balance that the
Jefferson-Hamilton argument over the power of the government
versus the liberty of the individual has been allowed to
continue as an on-going process, rather than to conclude with
victory for one viewpoint or the other. This same commitment
to maintaining an acceptable mean in the realm of ideas pro-
vides the necessary assurance that moral excess or extreme
absolutism will be avoided in the long-term. Certainly, an
affirmation of American moral values and ideals as components
of the national interest cannot ensure that policy-makers and
planners will never make mistakes in the short-term. No
concept of the national interest is that infallible.
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However, in the long view, it is the only course which will
ensure that the concept of the national interest chosen as
the basis of planning and the definition of national goals
will provide a true reflection of the American character and
the aspirations of the American Dream.
D. CONCLUSION
Theodore H. White was correct in his assessment that
"America has always been a questioning nation, always in
search of itself and of what it means and what it promises to
do" [138 J. Today there is a greater need than ever before
to put this search in focus, to make the national effort to
articulate a clear vision of the national interest. America
has only in the last decade confronted the reality that our
resources are not unlimited, that we must choose carefully
from among a variety of foreign policy aims and options.
Without a clear idea of the national interest, that selection
will continue to be an ad hoc process, and the nation will
continue to zig and zag rather than march steadily forward
toward the fulfillment of the American ideals of freedom and
democracy.
It is an unfortunate but inescapable characteristic of a
society dedicated to cultural, philosophic, and political
pluralism that there is no single or simple expression of the
national interest. Strategic planners, in considering alter-
native national strategies for the future, begin, not with
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an answer, but with a set of questions. They must ask them-
selves, for example,
(1) What kind of concept of the national interest is most
appropriate for the requirements of strategic planning -
shaping goals, establishing legitimacy, and building
consensus?
(2) How can the apparent utilities of both the idealistic
and realistic interpretations of politics be reconciled,
or must one choose one or the other?
(3) If abstract ideals and moral values serve an important
function in the definition of the national interest,
how should that function be integrated with the more
tangible factors that are subject to empirical
verification?
(4) What concept of the national interest provides an
accurate reflection of the pluralistic national
character and incorporates the idealistic aspirations
of the American Dream?
Theory cannot provide answers to questions such as these
which can satisfy everyone who has reference to the concept
of the national interest, for ultimately, they are beyond the
power of rational empiricism to answer. The answers cannot
be reduced into mathematical equations; no computer model or
graphic representation can begin to capture the complexity of
the national interest. Finding the answers, and casting them
in terms of the national interest, requires first that a leap
of faith be taken, an exertion of the will to believe in the
timeless validity of the ideals of the American Dream. Those
who seek to understand the national interest, and plan the
strategies which will protect it in the future, must take that
leap, and assert, along with Walter Lippman, that
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"The American idea is not an eccentricity in the history
of mankind. It is a hope and a pledge of fulfillment." [139
In the final analysis, the national interest is that which
moves the nation toward fulfillment of the idea.
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END NOTES
1. Charles Beard, The Idea of the National Interest
,
New
York, 1934. Although written half a century ago, this
remains one of the classic treatments of the national
interest.
2. For a concise summary of this research method, see
Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political
Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science , Ingle-
wood Cliffs, N.J., 1981, 158-161.
3. For the best summary of this research method, see
Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development
Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon
Lauren (editor) . Diplomacy: New Approaches in History,
Theory, and Policy
,
New York, 1979, 43-68.
4. For a description of the application of logical analysis
to social science research problems, see Wilson Gee,
Social Science Research Methods , New York, 1959, 292.
5. For additional comments on this semantic convention,
see Wayne A. R. Leys and Charner Marquis Perry,
"Philosophy and the Public Interest," unpublished
document prepared for symposium of The American Philo-
sophical Association held May 1, 1959, Appendix D, 68-69.
6. This dominance is reflected in such standard works as
Morton White, The Age of Analysis , New York, 1955, and
Albert W. Levi, Philosophy in The Modern World
,
Bloomington, Indiana, 19 51.
7. The following synopsis is derived from Morganthau's
best-known work, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace , New York, 1948/1967 (4th ed.),
4-14.
8. Many early American literary classics reflect or praise
these characteristics. Among the best-known are Ralph
Waldo Emmerson's "Self-Reliance," The Works of Ralph
Waldo Emmerson
,
New York, (date missing) and Benjamin
Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin
,
Collier, New York, 1956.
9. For a discussion of the intellectual roots of Pragmatism,
see Albert W. Levi, op. cit. {Note 6]
.
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10. In addition to popular music such as this song, the
malaise of twentieth century America has also been
reflected in some of the most thoughtful and provocative
literary works. Examples include John Dos Pasos,
American Trilogy , Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms ,
Norman Mailer, The Naked and The Dead
,
and Joseph
Heller, Catch 22 .
11. This criticism has been made of the primary planning
system used within The Department of Defense, The Plan-
ning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) . See, for
example, George F. Brown, Jr. and Laurence Korb, "The
Economic and Political Restraints on Force Planning,"
Naval War College Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 (June-July
1979) 51-63. Also Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith,
How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-
1969
,
Harper and Row, New York, 1971. Also Arnold
Kanter, Defense Politics : A Budgetary Perspective
,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1979.
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